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Abstract
Legislation outlined proposed changes in Galician Health Centres. This allowed us to set down
the theory about personal and organizational Information–Inﬂuence Matrices and then Frameworks
of Issues for the interactions between an individual Financial Manager and a Health Centre Co-
ordinator, as well as the proposed organizational changes into a new system [Purdy DE, Gago S.
Extending inﬂuence and accounting use: developing the frameworks to incorporate Galician legal
matters about the proposed healthcare changes with managers and organizations for empirical study.
Critical Perspectives on Accounting; in press].
Evidence from a longitudinal study covering January 1997 and December 2001, indicated
the suitability of these types of Matrices and Frameworks of Issues to analyse conversational
data.
Results agreed with anticipations at a personal level—wholly for a co-ordinator and partly for
the Financial Manager. Differences between the ﬁndings and our anticipated Financial Manager’s
framework are straightforward and we have amended our Framework accordingly. The organization
level has followed our anticipations though only 15% of Health Centres had continued with the new
system, 85% remained working with the old system.
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1GalicianlawcontainedaspirationsforchanginghealthcarewithautonomousHealthCentres.Span-
ish health policies and budget laws have inhibited moves to change, as well as the actions of the
professionals involved.
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due to one author discussing our theoretical and empirical approaches used in previous
studies (Purdy, 1993a, 1993b; Purdy and Gago, 2002) with a member of the Galician
Health Service. In 1999, the authors sought access to upper Financial Managers and Health
Centre Managers to study what was happening with these reforms but they had no detailed
knowledge about the legal background to these.
With the prospect of being granted access to study the Galician Health Centre reforms
over a number of years, we set out our general theoretical ideas about how we anticipated
these reforms would affect matters. We drew up a theoretical paper which detailed our
concepts about a Matrix of Information and Inﬂuence and a Framework of Issues which
couldbeusedattheleveloftheindividualmanagerinvolved.Thesetwotheoreticalconcepts
could be used to explain and detail the existing situations of the Financial Managers and the
HealthCentreManagers,thepersonnelmostlikelytobeinvolvedinthechanges.Thatpaper
explained the changes likely to occur and affect the relationship between these managers
(Purdy and Gago, 2003).
Next, we were granted access to monitor the non-medical aspects of the Galician Health
Centre reforms with one Financial Manager and the Health Centre Managers for whom
he was responsible. Finally, we were provided with the legislation which more ﬁnely indi-
cated the changes which were anticipated for the management of the non-medical activities
of Galician Health Centres. Since this legislation was different to our original general
theoretical ideas, we amended our ideas to reﬂect this (Purdy and Gago, 2007).
Theauthors’interpretationofthelegislationindicatedthefollowingmatters.AFinancial
Manager, from the Galician regional level, was anticipated to move from an inﬂuence
position of autonomy over the daily non-medical decisions at a Health Centre to a situation
where the Financial Manager was the potential recipient of reports about the running of
these decisions from a Health Centre Manager. We anticipated that the Financial Manager
waslikelytotrainaHealthCentreManageraboutthenon-medicalﬁnancialmatters.During
the time of working with the Health Centre Manager, it was anticipated that the Financial
Manager would gradually handover the daily inﬂuence to a Health Centre Manager who
would eventually be in a position of autonomous inﬂuence. One part of this process was
that as the Financial Manager had less inﬂuence so the Health Centre Manager’s inﬂuence
increased (Purdy and Gago, in press).
2Theconceptualbasesusedinourworkcomefromthetraditionofpersonalconstructpsy-
chology where each individual has unique views (Kelly, 1955). In 1999 we had anticipated
that our study of changes might take 5 or 6 years or even longer to implement, and antici-
pated we would seek to publish empirical ﬁndings at appropriate points in the future. The
study was ended suddenly by the Galician Health Service in December 2001. This abrupt
ending brought forward the need for an organizational analysis of these events using per-
sonal construction. Consequently, the revised paper went beyond the interpersonal analysis
of the changes between two such managers and extended the analysis to include theoretical
notions suitable to interpret the changes in the organizational/institutional arrangements
considered at a personal level (Purdy and Gago, in press).
This paper contains the empirical evidence from individual managers about the reforms
and changes in Galician healthcare due to be implemented between January 1997 and
December 2001. As already mentioned two theoretical papers explained the theoretical
bases of the ideas for comparison with the empirical materials reported in this paper (Purdy
and Gago, 2003, in press). Those papers fully discussed the antecedents of these theories.
This paper contains only a brief section about theory which essentially deals with the ﬁnal
theoretical individual situations for a Financial Manager, a Health Centre Manager, and the
organizational level of analysis.
The paper’s data comes from our interviews with managers. These materials have been
compared with our anticipations at the individual level, a Financial Manager and a Health
Centre Co-ordinator, and at the organizational level for the Health Centres. The majority
of people involved in our work were male and so keeping to our practice we use the male
form. The paper has the following structure.
The next section contains our brief theoretical perspectives. The third section discusses
the approaches and methods for the ﬁeld studies. The fourth main section contains the anal-
ysis of ﬁndings, whilst the ﬁfth main section considers the implications of the empirical
evidence for the authors’ theoretical approach. A sixth main section considers the implica-
tions of the ﬁndings to the authors’ norms, previously cited studies and other work, before
the paper ends with a summary and conclusions.
2. Theoretical perspectives
2.1. Prologue
The stimulus for our research is an interest in the handling and use of ﬁnancial man-
agement accounting information by managers in their work situations. We theorise about
the activities of the individuals, obtain data from people at work then analyse and compare
matterswiththetheoryattheleveloftheindividual.Weofferadynamicresearchframework
in a very complex area (Purdy and Gago, in press).
TheresearchfollowsthetraditionofpersonalconstructpsychologyestablishedbyKelly.
Amongstotherthingsitacceptsthateachpersonhasauniqueviewaboutlife.Thereisafocus
on the individual but, that there is commonality or similarity of views between individuals
and also a sociality of views when a person understands the social processes of the other
(Kelly, 1955).
3Hereweareconsideringthehandlinganduseofﬁnancialmanagementaccountinginfor-
mation by a dyad of managers. Initially in each dyad, one manager has much information
and inﬂuence and the second manager has no information and no inﬂuence. Galician leg-
islation has indicated that these situations will change and that a ﬁrst manager (Financial
Manager), who holds a position of autonomy, will eventually pass both speciﬁc infor-
mation and speciﬁc inﬂuence to a second manager (Health Centre Manager), so that the
second manager then holds an autonomous position. Each dyad will differ because the
actions of an individual manager will relate to the speciﬁc work context. We concentrate on
the constructs of Inﬂuence and Information that concern the individual managers in their
own work situation, and relate this to an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix (Purdy and Gago,
in press).
In the previous paper, the authors’ basic theoretical positions and their antecedents were
expounded then discussed. We moved from generalised theories and integrated our under-
standing of Galician legislation into our theoretical positions. These revisions were made
in order to make the theory “a Galician anticipations/theory” so that this theory could be
compared directly with our empirical materials. The authors were not aware of any directly
comparable study but were aware that, elsewhere, moves towards changes in the provision
of more information and more inﬂuence to employees had not occurred smoothly (Purdy,
1988). Following these amendments we discussed various matters and critiqued the work.
The discussion commented on retos (retos is explained and discussed with informa-
tion later), the nature of other types of information, participative management notions, a
FinancialManagerandaHealthCentreManager,UKevidenceconcerninginformationand
inﬂuence(CentreforDecision-MakingStudies,1979;Goodlad,1984;Purdy,1988),general
European Economic Community views on information provision and employee involve-
ment (European Communities Commission, 1994) and US evidence in the accounting area
ofourwork(Arnold,1999;ParkerandKyj,2006;ScottandTiessen,1999;Spekman,1979).
In addition there were critical comments on the Galician context and similar changes else-
where, including a critique of the underlying different cultural norms of each author in
relation to Galicianization, the Galician quest for autonomy with Health Centres and the
Galician identity in relation to our work.
We provided evidence about proposals for changes, to introduce more information pro-
vision to employees and more inﬂuence to employees in the European Community, the
UK and the US, that were accompanied by strong narratives promoting the processes. The
realities were that some changes did not occur, or had been altered, either before, during
or after their introduction. In general the outcomes were more favourable for managers and
less favourable for non-management employees.
The remainder of this section relates to the theoretical notions to be considered in the
analysis of the empirical materials.
2.2. Using the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix (Purdy and Gago, in press)
2.2.1. Introduction
The Information–Inﬂuence Matrix is a representation of the position of an individual
manager’s views about information and inﬂuence in a speciﬁc relationship with another
manager at one time. To demonstrate changes in each individual’s position it is possible to
4use a Matrix showing discrete changes for a Financial Manager and a second Matrix for a
Health Centre Manager.
Following from this, the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix can be used in a similar manner
attheleveloftheHealthCentreOrganization.ThereisrepresentationonaMatrixindicating
the anticipated changes to the situations of the Health Centres. There was also the use of
three Frameworks of Issues, to list the changes anticipated by the theory and specify the
movements within each Matrix: for a Financial Manager, a Health Centre Manager and the
Organization Issues for the Health Centres.
This theory paper considered that the provision of accounting information to an orga-
nization’s managers and employees has fostered the provision and use of the information
by these individuals. The social constructions of organizational activities engendered man-
agerandemployeeinvolvement,alongwithmanagerandmanagerinvolvement,aspossible
conditions of inﬂuence. From these notions came the personal construction and social con-
struction of an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix through which to develop understandings of
the individual interactions of people at work.
2.2.2. Inﬂuence
The original construct of inﬂuence contained four markers: No Inﬂuence, Communica-
tion, Consultation and Participation (Purdy and Gago, 2003). When the changing situation
between the two managers was reviewed, it was considered that the Financial Manager
would already be in a position of Autonomy over the daily non-medical decisions of the
Health Centre. We have included Autonomy as a ﬁfth marker of inﬂuence. It is placed on
our construct after Participation, as a form of participation; however, we are aware that it
can be argued that Autonomy is a form of Consultation.
Our theoretical and operational deﬁnitions of inﬂuence are as follows.
• No Inﬂuence is the position where the manager is not allowed to exercise any inﬂuence
in the organization in the formal sense, or perceives no obvious inﬂuence in the situation.
A manager could inﬂuence matters by leaving the organization.
• Communication is a position where the ﬁrst manager tells a second manager about a
decisionalreadytaken,forexample,bytheﬁrstmanager.Thesecondmanagermighthave
the opportunity to formally express an opinion about the decision, but cannot directly
inﬂuence the situation because the decision was already taken.
• Consultation is the position where the ﬁrst manager provides information to the second
manager about a situation, and the second manager has an opportunity to express an
opinion to the ﬁrst manager before the ﬁrst manager takes the decision. Here the second
manager could affect the ﬁrst manager’s decision because of the discussion.
• Participation is the position where the second manager receives information about a
situation and discusses this with the ﬁrst manager before they jointly take a decision, or
take it in some manner which they jointly agreed previously. The second manager has
the most opportunity to inﬂuence a situation, and for participation to happen, the ﬁrst
manager and second manager have to interact. Any information can come from either
person.
• Participation requires the second manager to be an effective and active person capable
of learning, as well as providing ideas and information. Information, inﬂuence and inter-
5action all appear to be necessary for participation to be in a state to occur (Purdy and
Gago, 2003).
• Autonomy means that, a manager is able to act and take a decision alone without ﬁrst
referring to or conferring with another, at the time when the decision is taken. The
manager exercising Autonomy may have referred to and conferred with others before the
time when the decision was taken, and so be aware of the views of these others. In using
the word Autonomy we consider the manager to have taken the decision in the context
of the organization, so that this does not mean that the manager has personal freedom to
act, but organizational freedom to act.
2.2.3. Information
The information construct contains four basic markers. The operation of the construct is
based on the notion of decision distance with employees in a participative situation. Wall
and Lischeron devised and tested the concept that an employee was aware of a distance
that decisions were taken from their immediate job. They called the closest distance deci-
sions such as related to the employee’s job “Local”. The decisions taken at a “Medium”
distance from an employee could affect a department. The decisions taken furthest from
an employee were “Distant” and could affect a whole organization (Wall and Lischeron,
1977).
Thesedecisiontypeswereadaptedtotheconceptofinformationinfourareas.Themark-
ers are: No Information, Local Information, Medium Information and Distant Information.
These markers were anticipated to be sufﬁcient for our empirical work, but, we recognised
that at the point when the Financial Manager has handed over autonomy to the Health Cen-
tre Manager then the Financial Manager would be in a different situation, and, would be a
recipient of information from the Health Centre Manager. In this different situation there
would still be Local Information, but it would be Different Local Information received by
the Financial Manager.
The deﬁnitions of information are:
• NoInformationisthepositionwherethemanagerperceivesthatnoinformationisreceived
or provided.
• Local Information is that information which exists for the current and immediate job
at hand. It is a local decision for the manager and likely to be the smallest quantity of
information.
• Medium Information is information for decisions further than the immediate job or the
initial work activity. Decisions are taken at a medium distance from the manager and this
information is likely to be more complex than local information.
• Distant Information, is any information used for decisions beyond medium decisions.
Such decisions are taken at the furthest distance from the manager and probably use the
most complex of information from any part of the organization.
We have introduced all of the components relating to a Matrix for our representations
for the understanding of the Galician situations about a Financial Manager, a Health Centre
ManagerandtheHealthCentreasanOrganization.Alloftheserepresentationsuseasimilar
Matrix and the basic Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix is shown in Fig. 1.
6Fig. 1. Basic Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
2.2.4. Information types
After reviewing the Galician materials we concluded that a Financial Manager was
anticipated to take all daily non-medical decisions after considering “all information”.
We were unable to deﬁne “all information” as we had no knowledge about the types of
information likely to be available with a Health Centre.
Ourreviewdidindicateseveralareasofpossibleinformationmattersthatcouldaffectthe
working contexts of the Financial Manager and the Health Centre Manager and thus affect
theresearchFramework.Forexample,anychangesconcerningHealthCentreactivitieshad
been anticipated to occur through the involvement of the community in which the Health
Centre is located. It was acknowledged that changes were anticipated to occur without
additional time or money being available. The legislation indicated that some professionals
would have changes to remuneration, some individuals would work with retos and that
information would be devised to examine the outcomes an individual’s retos.
The word retos has no direct translation to English and was discussed and interpreted for
the speciﬁc context of our study in the following three sentences. Retos relates to an area
of activity where the area’s objective is difﬁcult to develop or carry out. For these reasons
the retos constitutes a stimulus for the people who are trying to work in that area. A retos
is somewhat intangible and a qualitative developmental aspect of life. We had no idea what
types of retos would be used with a Financial Manager and a Health Centre Manager, but
thelegislationindicatedobjectiveswouldbesetandreportedupon,thuscreatingsomeform
of information. We had anticipated that such information could be used with an appropriate
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
It was our anticipation that because of the Financial Manager’s work, he would know
which information he and other managers used in taking decisions about the daily activities
of a Health Centre. In our terminology this would be Local Information but for the other
areas we had no anticipations.
We now consider the speciﬁc anticipated changes for a Financial Manager and a Health
Centre Manager.
2.2.5. Anticipated changes of Information and Inﬂuence with a Financial Manager
2.2.5.1. A Financial Manager’s Personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix. It is anticipated
that the effect of these changes will alter the Framework of Issues on the Personal
7Fig. 2. Theoretical/anticipated movements of a Financial Manager in the Matrix relative to a Health Centre
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Information–Inﬂuence Matrix of a Financial Manager. Over an unknown period it was
anticipated that a Financial Manager will pass through ﬁve changes of information and
inﬂuence. He will move from Autonomy using Local Health Centre Information, through
Participation, Consultation and Communication on the Personal Information–Inﬂuence
Matrix shown in Fig. 2.
When a Health Centre Manager achieves autonomy, the Financial Manager will have a
different relationship with that manager. At the time a Health Centre Manager achieves
autonomy a changed relationship between the managers would have occurred and the
HealthCentreManagerwouldthenreportaboutLocalDifferentInformationtotheFinancial
Manager. We did not know what this Local Different Information might be. The changed
relationship indicates a different Information–Inﬂuence Matrix for the Financial Manager
with the Health Centre Manager, a position of Local Different Information and Communi-
cation,andisshowninFig.3.InthiswayaFinancialManagerwillhavelessinﬂuenceupon
the Health Centre’s daily activities and a Health Centre Manager will have more inﬂuence.
Fig. 3. Theoretical/anticipated position of a Financial Manager after Health Centre Manager achieves Autonomy
Matrix.
82.2.5.2. A Financial Manager’s Framework of Issues. The Framework of Issues and the
movement on a Financial Manager’s Matrix will be as follows:
1. Starts in the Local Information–Autonomy box.
2. After a period of time will interact with the Health Centre Manager and will be located
in the Local Information–Participation box.
3. After a short period of time will interact with the Health Centre Manager and so will
then be located in the Local Information–Consultation box.
4. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Information–
Communication box.
5. After a further period of interaction will be located in the Local Different
Information–Communication box.
The changes in items 1–4, the anticipated movements of a Financial Manager in the
Matrix in relation to a Health Centre Manager, are shown in Fig. 2. A Financial Manager
would receive the Local Different Information, item 5, from a Health Centre Manager, as
in Fig. 3.
2.2.6. Anticipated changes of Information and Inﬂuence with a Health Centre Manager
2.2.6.1. A Health Centre Manager’s Personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix. The Health
Centre Manager’s task is to gain Autonomy to be able to run the daily non-medical activ-
ities of the Health Centre. The extent to which this Autonomy occurs will relate to the
Financial Manager and his requirements. It is anticipated that the Health Centre Manager
will start without knowledge, information and inﬂuence but will acquire these and have
AutonomytoruntheHealthCentre’sdailyactivities.DuringthistimetheHealthCentreMan-
ager will obtain the necessary requirements from the Financial Manager or other forms of
training.
The rate at which these changes will occur is not known and will be agreed with
the Financial Manager. The Health Centre Manager will acquire various parts of Local
Information and move through different stages of inﬂuence until Autonomy is reached.
When the Health Centre Manager is involved with running the Health Centre, it seems
likely that the Health Centre Manager will then become a source of different informa-
tion for the Financial Manager about the Health Centre. Such a change could occur
at any stage but, as we noted earlier, we have no clear views about these types of
information.
Theanticipatedmovementsofthesechanges,foraHealthCentreManageronhispersonal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix, are shown in Fig. 4.
2.2.6.2. A Health Centre Manager’s Framework of Issues. The Framework of Issues and
changes on the Health Centre Manager’s Matrix are:
1. Starts in the No Information–No Inﬂuence box.
2. After a short period of time will interact with the Financial Manager and so will then be
located in the Local Information–Communication box.
3. AfterafurtherperiodofinteractionwillbelocatedintheLocalInformation–Consultation
box.
9Fig. 4. Theoretical/anticipated movements of a Health Centre Manager on a Matrix.
4. AfterafurtherperiodofinteractionwillbelocatedintheLocalInformation–Participation
box.
5. After a period of time will be located in the Local Information–Autonomy box.
2.2.7. Organizational and institutional level of analysis
We now extend our methods to the organizational level. The materials here are a refor-
mulationandclariﬁcationofourviewsandevidenceexpressedinthepreviouspaper(Purdy
and Gago, in press).
The main theoretical basis here is the psychology of personal constructs which con-
siders each individual as unique (Kelly, 1955). Although unique, people do not operate
in isolation. The name of the psychology, personal construct psychology, highlights the
psychology’s emphasis on what people do and construe in all spheres of life. Although
we construe uniquely, classiﬁcations have been made with the personal constructs of man-
agers. In a study of senior managers on one committee in a UK Regional Health Authority,
when they construed the ﬁnancial management accounting data provided to and used by
that committee, patterns of personal ﬁnancial management accounting constructs emerged.
These classiﬁcations of such personal constructs demonstrates a commonality or similarity
of views amongst the managers in one organization (Purdy, 1991).
Itispossibletoconsideroneorganizationfromthepersonalconstructperspectivebecause
the psychology includes, amongst other things, the notion of sociality. A sociality of views
occurswhenonepersonunderstandsthesocialprocessesoftheotherperson.Herethesocial
processesoftheotherpersonareinvolvedintheorganizationinwhichtheywork.Itisclearly
quite valid to seek and accept the views of a person about the position of an organization
in which they work. It was anticipated that there could be different organizational views
about an organization’s position, depending upon which individuals are involved and their
speciﬁc views.
The Information–Inﬂuence Matrix was formed from the social construction litera-
ture. The socially constructed reports and accounts of some companies, newly ﬂoated
on the London Stock Exchange, were used as empirical evidence of each company’s
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constructions of ﬁve Information markers and ﬁve Inﬂuence markers associated with an
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix (as mentioned above), it was possible to demonstrate the dif-
ferences in Information and Inﬂuence for the employees of each company. The differences
amongst each company’s types of accounting data and forms of organizational inﬂuence,
reported as available to employees, enabled the companies to be considered in one of three
different areas of an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix (Purdy, 1993b).
The outcomes of the activities and the outcomes we anticipate observing will be socially
constructed. The socially constructed reports were used with an Information–Inﬂuence
Matrix, and in the same way the socially constructed outcomes of the Galician Health
Centres, in relation to changes in Galician healthcare, can be represented by an
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix. This is our theoretical basis for analysing organizational
activities.
2.2.7.1. A Health Centre’s Organizational Information–Inﬂuence Matrix. The same ﬁve
markers of Information and of Inﬂuence will be used with the organization as have been
usedwiththemanagersintheprevioustwosubsections.Thisbringswithitthesamenotions
that are known and have been anticipated and those that have not.
OurunderstandingoftheGalicianlegislation,withitswrittenpolicytowardseachHealth
Centre Organization, is that each Health Centre has the original position of No Information
and No Inﬂuence. When the new system starts it will provide Local Information in a Com-
municationposition, but the intention is to pass through Consultationand Participationand
to move to an Autonomy inﬂuence position with Local Information.
The anticipated movements of these changes for a Health Centre Organization on a
Health Centre Matrix are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Theoretical/anticipated changes of a Health Centre Organization on a Matrix.
112.2.7.2. Health Centres Framework of Issues. The Framework of Organization Issues and
the changes anticipated for the Health Centres are:
1. Original position is No Information–No Inﬂuence.
2. New system starts in the Local Information–Communication box.
3. After a period will be located in the Local Information–Consultation box.
4. After a further period will be located in the Local Information–Participation box.
5. After a period of time will be located in the Local Information–Autonomy box.
3. Field studies
3.1. Background
3.1.1. Relationship of theory and objectives of ﬁeld studies
The theoretical perspectives section set out three different areas in need of empirical
evidence:
1. At the level of the Health Centres we anticipated that if a Health Centre followed the
reformsthenitwouldmovefromanoriginalsituationofNoInformationandNoInﬂuence
and with the start of a new system it would move to the position of Local Informa-
tion/Communication to Local Information/Autonomy. This was set out in a Framework
of Five Organization Issues and the changes anticipated for the Health Centres on a
Health Centre Organization Matrix. We required empirical evidence about the events
occurring at the various Health Centres in the process of reforms, in order to verify or
modifyornegateourtheoreticalFrameworkofFiveIssuesandthemovementonaHealth
Centres Organization’s Matrix. Our objective was to obtain evidence from a Financial
Manager about these events along with any appropriate materials from Health Centre
Managers.
2. We anticipated that if a Financial Manager followed the reforms then he would move
from a position of Local Information/Autonomy to being a recipient of Different
Local Information/Communication. This was set out in a Framework of Five Issues
on the personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix of a Financial Manager. We required
empirical evidence about a Financial Manager’s actions, during the course of the
reforms with a Health Centre Manager, in order to verify or modify or negate our
theoretical Framework of Five Issues and the movement on a Financial Manager’s
Matrix. Our objective was to obtain evidence from a Financial Manager about these
events.
3. In a similar manner we anticipated that if a Health Centre Manager followed the reforms
then he would move from a position of No Information/No Inﬂuence to Local Infor-
mation/Autonomy. This was set out in a Framework of Five Issues on the personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix of a Health Centre Manager. We required empirical evi-
dence about a Health Centre Manager’s actions, during the course of the reforms with a
Financial Manager, in order to verify or modify or negate our theoretical Framework of
Five Issues and the movement on a Health Centre Manager’s Matrix. Our objective was
to obtain evidence from Health Centre Managers about these events.
12In each of these three areas we anticipated being able to consider the unfolding of events
and to compare these with our Frameworks of Issues and Matrices then comment upon the
differences.
3.1.2. Background to access
In order to conduct a study, in 1999, we made contact with the Galician Health Service,
and,laterthatyearweregivenpermissiontoworkwithoneoftheﬁveGalicianareaFinancial
Managers and a number, of Health Centre Co-ordinators who worked with this Financial
Manager.TheHealthCentreCo-ordinators,whohadthesamefunctionthatwehadattributed
to the Health Centre Managers in the theory section of this paper, were to be contacted by
us, after they had agreed to speak with us through the Financial Manager. We assured the
Financial Manager that no information would be published that could identify anyone we
spoke with, so as to allow all to speak with complete freedom.
The Financial Manager had regular contact with his Health Centre Co-ordinators, knew
the stage of change that each Centre had reached and it was agreed that we would
be allowed access to a number of different Health Centre Co-ordinators, the precise
number and which co-ordinators were to be determined by the events of the adoption
of reforms at Health Centres. We had no precise numbers in mind, since the Finan-
cial Manager indicated that there would be many Health Centres involved and a lot of
opportunity for us to hold conversations with co-ordinators at various stages during the
reforms.
3.1.3. Methodology with Financial Manager, access, protocols between authors and
participants
The collection of empirical evidence started when both authors undertook an extensive
conversation with the Financial Manager, in both Spanish and English lasting 2 hours. The
methodology for the meeting followed the open conversational approach towards the man-
ager, being attentive and listening to his thoughts, responding to these with appropriate
questions being centred on the person and, making appropriate notes, as used in a previ-
ous study with managers (Purdy, 1993a, 1993b). On this occasion, however, the Financial
Manager was content for a tape recorder to be used too.
ThisconversationobtaineddetailsoftheFinancialManager’sjobandtheGalicianHealth
Service’sHealthCentreOrganization,existingstructure,itscurrentsystemsofdoingthings,
the expenditures of previous years and the budget. He spoke about the change experienced
and to be experienced by the Galician Healthcare Service and the new system in terms
of inﬂuence exercised and the use of accounting information. Motivation and incentives
related to the new system were also discussed. We call the former the old system and the
latter the new system.
At this conversation it was agreed that at appropriate and convenient times the Financial
Manager would allow one author to collect the views of a number of the Health Centre Co-
ordinators and himself. In this way the progress of the Financial Manager and some Health
Centre Co-ordinators would be noted as the new system was introduced. It was accepted
that we had to follow the activity of the Financial Manager and could not approach anyone
other than through him. No deﬁnite time horizon was placed on this work. The Financial
Manager had a general expectation that he would try to bring about the planned alterations
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within 3–4 years.
IntheperiodbetweenSeptember1999andDecember2001contactwasmaintainedwith
the Financial Manager with a number of phone calls, when written notes were made, and
emails. This contact allowed the collection of additional materials and the legal references
regarding the new system and its implementation. During this time the Financial Manager
allowed contact to be made with only one Health Centre Co-ordinator and thus only one
conversation/interview was held with a Health Centre Co-ordinator.
At the ﬁnal conversation with the Financial Manager, in December 2001, the open
methodology was used, hand-written notes were taken but no tape recorder used. The
Financial Manager was not provided with material related to the content of the interview
beforehand. He spoke about the current situation of the new system and made general com-
mentsregardingthechangesexperiencedbyhimintermsofinﬂuenceandinformationfrom
1999 to 2001.
At this point our contact with the manager ended as he did not want to provide us with
further detailed materials. He did subsequently comment on an early draft of this paper and
the previous theoretical paper (Purdy and Gago, in press).
3.1.4. Protocols between the authors
During this conversation the authors were made aware that various parts of Galician
legislation had forecast and indicated facets of the new approach being applied by the
Financial Manager. The authors had already set down the general Framework and methods
(PurdyandGago,2003),butdidnotknowtheprecisenatureofthisexistinglegislation.This
meantthatasecondtheorypapermightberequiredtakingthelegislationintoconsideration.
The authors wanted to produce the most accurate Frameworks and Matrices they could,
afteratranslationofthelawsintoEnglishandafteraconsiderationofhowtheselawsaffected
theirprevioustheoreticalposition.Theydecidedtoworkseparatelywithoneauthorworking
on the ﬁeld studies. The separate working was an attempt to preserve the interpretation of
the prospects of the law from being affected by practice, even inadvertently.
The other author amended the theory of the Frameworks and Matrices to incorporate the
legal position, but retaining the views and anticipations held before we had contact with the
Financial Manager. This interpretation from the law was produced, discussed and agreed
with the second author. Before the theoretical parts of this work had been completed (Purdy
and Gago, in press), only the second author knew what was happening in the ﬁeld studies,
and that remained the situation until 2 years after the ﬁeld studies had in fact ended.




would be handwritten. It was also anticipated that they would have different backgrounds
to the Financial Manager, likely to be medical practitioners not versed in our world, nor us
versed in their medical worlds.
We considered the matters we wanted an interview to cover and produced a schedule of
33 questions, but, our intention was to encourage a free conversation from the Co-ordinator
14in as many cases as possible. The questions were based on previous research (Purdy and
Gago,2002).Theywerenotexpressedinacademicjargon,butaimedatestablishinggeneral
topicstobediscussed,tostimulatefurtherdiscussionwiththeco-ordinatorsandenablethem
to talk freely about their circumstances and their matters of concern. They would not be
provided with a copy of the questions.
Our intention had been to speak with a sufﬁcient number of co-ordinator who were at
different points in the new system. We wanted to follow their changes to the management
of a Health Centre. The purpose of the interaction would be to ﬁnd out as much as possible
about any changes that had been envisaged, discussed, accepted, rejected, and the effects of
theactualsituationontheCentreandtheco-ordinator.Despiteourbestattemptstointerview
more, only one Health Centre Co-ordinator was interviewed.
During the course of the sole interview, the co-ordinator was asked about his job and its
evolution since he had started at the Health Centre. He was also asked about his inﬂuence
on decision-making in the Health Centre and the accounting data available for it. Details
about the accounting system and the use of accounting data by him and his subordinates
were written down. His training, motivation and incentives were also mentioned.
3.2. Data collected from Financial Manager—September 1999
3.2.1. Structure
The Financial Manager’s views in this section have been categorised into three sets of
views. First, his Background, second the Factual Changes comprised of Old Structure and
System,theDeterminationoftheNewSystemforHealthCentres,theNewSystem,Budgets
and Data Use in a Health Centre and ﬁnally Participation, Performance and Responsibility.
ThethirdsetofviewsistheFinancialManager’spersonalobservationsaboutthechanges.
He commented on the source of the New System, Perceptions about the New System,
Management and the New System, ﬁnally Initial Anticipations about the New System.
3.2.1.1. Financial Manager’s background. The manager was a Divisional Financial Man-
ager working in Economic Resources with a degree in economics, 10 years training and
wide experience in accounting and ﬁnance. He valued most his independence in decision-
making in his work. He valued most in a subordinate the ability to give possible solutions
to the diverse problems that might appear in a Health Centre. He valued most in a superior
the ability to listen and involve all the personnel in a common goal.
3.2.1.2. Factual changes.
3.2.1.2.1. Old structure and system. In 1999, the Galician Health Service was man-
aged through ﬁve divisions: Human Resources, Pharmacy, Public Health, Healthcare and
Economic Resources. Throughout the Region there were a number of public hospitals, and
about 500 primary Health Centres (subsequently called Health Centres). Each centre was
administered locally by a co-ordinator but managed ﬁnancially by one of a small number
of senior divisional managers such as this Financial Manager.
The Financial Manager worked with the Director of Healthcare, the person responsi-
ble for the deployment of doctors, nurses and care in the Galician Region. Within this
relationship, the Financial Manager discussed the care concerns of the Health Centres.
15The Financial Manager also worked with the Economic Resources Director, the person
responsible for the ﬁnancing of healthcare services in the Galician Region. The Economic
Resources Director was also responsible for a range of associated activities such as the
general administration of the accounting systems, the provision of supplies, maintenance
and personnel to the hospitals and the Health Centres. For each Health Centre the Financial
Managersoughttoco-ordinatetheprovisionofhealthcarealongwithalloftheseassociated
activities.
The total amount of ﬁnance for all health care was ﬁxed for the Galician Region. The
Financial Manager brought together the current healthcare activity at each Health Centre
and the ﬁnance for this. He sought approval for various levels of activities at each Health
CentrefromtheDirectorofHealthcare,anddeterminedthebudgetforthesecentreswiththe
Economic Resources Director. Occasionally, during the meetings to determine the budget,
some of the proposed activities were dropped because there was a limit on the amount of
ﬁnance available for the following year. There was a true negotiation of alternatives, and at
times this had been at the national level.
ToconstructabudgetthemanagersinEconomicResourcestookthetotaloftheprevious
year’s expenditure, added the anticipated activity and discussed this in different meetings
until that budget was approved. There was one large budget for all Health Centres kept
at the division. The budget was nominally allocated to each Health Centre but there were
no transfers of funds to the Health Centre because the ﬁnance was held at the division.
Records of activities and spending were kept at the division by the Healthcare Division and
the accounting system in the Economic Resources Division.
Normallytherewassomeoneresponsibleforacentre,avoluntarypositionﬁllednormally
by a medical doctor. The authorisation for any activity had to be agreed by the Financial
Manager. Even small repairs and the purchase of any small items were required to be taken
from a budget that had been previously agreed before the expenditure. In this way the
Financial Manager noted that he has “close control for if I did not control them they would
go crazy and spend”.
3.2.1.2.2. ThedeterminationofnewsystemfortheHealthCentres. Healthcentresthat
wanted to work with the new system had been determined by approaching the each centre’s
medical staff and getting their agreement. The staff were told that the new system would
be computerised and allow them to improve their service, providing more time for patients.
Their participation in this new system was wanted. In theory all staff at a Health Centre
couldbeinvolvedinthedecisiontochange,however,inpracticethedecisionhadtobemade
by common agreement of all the professional staff, the doctors, nurses and administrators.
It was essential that the professionals had an interest in participating in the new system,
because the small additional ﬁnancial incentive was unlikely to have much effect upon
them. For example, doctors could earn more in private medicine. If the professionals did
not want to change, then the Health Centre would continue with the old system, for the time
being. There were 45 centres working with the old system and 32 working with the new
system. The new system was being implemented gradually in those Health Centres that had
expressed an interest in working with it.
3.2.1.2.3. New system. There were a variety of objectives with the new system which
started to operate in the administrative year January 1997. An objective of the new system
wasforeachHealthCentretocreateahealthcaremanagementsystemwithitsprofessionals’
16preferredactivitiesfortheHealthCentre.Inaddition,therefore,toaHealthCentre’scurrent
healthcare activities, its professionals could state what other matters they would like to
undertake. They could produce a programme of oral hygiene, or produce a history of its
population’shealth.Theseadditionalactivitiesneededtobeplannedandﬁnancedseparately
to ensure that current healthcare was maintained and unaffected.
Another objective of the new system was to enable appropriate Health Centres to move
in the direction of more autonomy. For the ﬁrst time there would be a recognised Health
Centre Co-ordinator, a doctor responsible for what happened there. The Financial Manager
described a co-ordinator as, “our intermediary amongst other professionals who tells us all
of the problems of everyone in the centre”.
A co-ordinator organised all of a centre’s work, from healthcare service provision to the
replacementofpersonnel.Theco-ordinatorcouldbuysmallquantitiesofsuppliesandsmall
repairs without previous authorisation. However, the Financial Manager always required
the co-ordinator to agree a budget with him before buying, even if only with a telephone
call. This was because the Financial Manager liked to control them permanently.
In the new system, the centre co-ordinator participated in formulating an agreement (it
was not a contract) about the anticipated activities and their ﬁnancing with the Financial
Manager.Theagreementwasreachedbyconsensus.Healthcentreactivitieswerediscussed
and the associated budget was drawn up. There was a concern for both the quantity and
quality of work at a centre. The co-ordinator was expected to be at a centre 7 hours a day.
3.2.1.2.4. Budgets and data use in a Health Centre. Each centre had its own budget
whichwasrelatedtotheanticipatedactivityforthenextyearandknowntotheco-ordinator.




electricity, heating and cleaning. This approach gave the Financial Manager and the co-
ordinator the opportunity for closer control of the centre’s activities, since they both knew
the budget. The money and the budget were still held at the division.
In September 1999, the new system had two levels of co-ordination operating. There
were 30 centres at the ﬁrst level whose co-ordinator had to send expenses information and
invoices to the Financial Manager for payment. With this level the co-ordinator received
summaries of the resources used. There were two centres at the second level whose co-
ordinator received the Level 1 information but also received details of personnel capacity
for the centre and the amount of budget still available. Table 1 shows the total numbers and
different levels of Health Centre Co-ordinators at September 1999.
Table 1






17The Health Centres did not keep accounting records. From 1997, the co-ordinators were
provided with detailed information about the ﬁnancial position with sheets of data about
the previous month. The data was prepared in a way that could be understood by those
individuals who were not used to accounting data. The sheets contained all of the data
about bills passed for payment, and all of the items from the central stores. The reason for
this regular reporting was to enable the Health Centre to affect its usage, and to correct
any activities so that the budget was not exceeded. This system changed in October 1998
to three monthly reporting of information from the Finance Department. A co-ordinator at
any level received three monthly data sheets and could now examine the centre’s evolution
of activities.
The Financial Manager wanted to send data, especially budget associated data, to the
Health Centres because he considered that the co-ordinator should have comprehensive
information, and be able to work with the budgets. When the ﬁnancial data was provided to
the Health Centre Co-ordinators, a dialogue started with the Financial Manager about what
the data meant, and what it could be used for.
3.2.1.2.5. Participation,performanceandresponsibility. Bymovingtothenewsystem
it was possible for a centre’s staff to have some degree of participation in the formulation of
that centre’s agreement with the Financial Manager. The Financial Manager observed that
all staff had seen the agreement and “were able to participate in an active way. The staff
decided upon the service they would provide, what they would do and how they would do
it.”
Within all agreements, the Health Centre staff were allowed to employ new staff, under
guidance, whilst other activities were their responsibility. At the second level the staff were
askedtoachieveaminimumamountofactivitiesovertheyear.Ifthisminimumwasachieved
the staff received a salary bonus, paid 3 months after the year’s end.
The co-ordinator were professional people who needed to be involved, and not treated
as though they were under suspicion and constant vigilance. The involvement of the pro-
fessionals had been encouraged by offering them the prospect of more money.
In the new system the doctors’ salaries were variable, and varied as a function of the
objectives achieved. The salary issue was not negotiable, because it was an objective of the
new system for the doctors to have a variable salary, not a ﬁxed one. The results of each
Health Centre were measured using the objectives and programme agreed. At Level 2 the
Health Centres could generate savings in relation to the budget and then decide how to use
a part of those savings.
3.2.1.3. Financial Manager’s personal observations—September 1999.
3.2.1.3.1. Source of new system. The system had come from central government and
the Financial Manager was very enthusiastic about the system for it was an opportunity
to improve the delivery of healthcare and resource allocation. The notions of productivity
included with the programme also came from central government.
3.2.1.3.2. Perceptions about the new system. An agreement made at the ﬁrst level was
only a joint agreement about information. The Financial Manager anticipated that more
Health Centres would join Level 1 within the next year.
The staff working at Level 2 were uncertain about the savings they would receive. The
doctors at Level 2 liked the power to decide where and how to use the money, but did not
18like the inability to modify the budget headings and so were unable to use funds in the ways
they thought appropriate.
The Financial Manager liked the direct participation of the co-ordinators in determining
the expenditures, as they were actively participating in running the Health Centre and
improvedthenewsystemdaily.TheFinancialManagerdidnotliketherigidnormsimposed
by the new system and the lack of freedom to act.
3.2.1.3.3. Managementandthenewsystem. Therehadbeenonlyslightimprovements
in the management of the Health Centres at Level 1 with the new system. The co-ordinators
had received information, but could not alter affairs much. Level 1 made the co-ordinator
aware of the expenditure of the centre’s activities, and how the budget was allocated to
various expenditures.
The two Level 2 Health Centres now had monetary incentives which were important,
but the most valued incentive for doctors was their independence in management. They
could now act as professionals. The divisional senior management considered that a ﬁxed
salary would not act as an incentive for the doctors. In one of the only two Level 2 Health
Centres, a saving on the budget had occurred, whilst in the other there had been an increase
in expenditure which had now stopped.
The health professionals now knew what their actions meant for expenditures. Their
activities caused the expenditures which they now felt they owned and had become more
interested in expenditures.
3.2.1.3.4. Initial anticipations about the new system. There would be a more ﬂuid
relationship in which everyone would work together to achieve the objectives. In future
the relationship of the Health Centre with the Financial Manager would be different and it
wouldnotbelimitedtotheHealthCentrebeingincontact,informingtheFinancialManager
when something was wrong.
The management of healthcare was anticipated to improve because the professionals
were involved and would see that their actions had been useful.
3.3. Data collected from Financial Manager—from September 1999 to December 2001
3.3.1. Introduction
It was noted earlier that, as anticipated, two face-to-face conversations were held with
the Financial Manager. As noted at 3.1.3, contact was maintained by emails and telephone
conversationstocollectlegaldetailsandadditionalmaterials.Afterthesehadbeenreceived
contact continued and the Financial Manager had been encouraged to allow access to more
than one co-ordinator. At the ﬁnal conversation he provided the latest ﬁgures about the
changes with the Health Centres at December 2001. The materials in sub-section 3.3 come
from these emails and all other conversations.
3.3.2. New system—Levels 2–4
By the end of the study the Financial Manager had discussed these new Levels 3 and 4,
and, introduced a Level 3 Health Centre. He noted the main difference between Level 2 and
Level 3 status was that a co-ordinator at Level 2 could decide only how to spend a part of
the budget savings, whilst the Level 3 co-ordinator could had increased inﬂuence and could
decide how to spend a larger part of the budget savings.
19The Financial Manager had also investigated the possibilities of a Health Centre moving
to proposed self-management of Level 4. With self-management the Financial Manager
considered a co-ordinator to be able to be in position of autonomy, an ideal state that would
be Utopia. He noted, however, that with the current Spanish laws and healthcare norms
it was impossible for the Galician Region to create a Level 4 Health Centre. He felt very
frustrated because the system had failed to be able to bring about change.
He noted that the centres at Levels 2 and 3 had internal organizational structures, which
impliedthatthoseatLevel1didnot.ThismightmeanthatthosecentresatLevel1andthose
centres in the old system are the same in terms of organizational structure.
3.3.3. Budget use and budget performance
Every 3 months the Financial Manager met with each co-ordinator to discuss how the
centre’s actual activities compared with the anticipated activities. The Financial Manager
notedthattheHealthCentreCo-ordinatorsatbothLevel2and3gavereasonstojustifywhy
their expenses had increased. The Financial Manager only occasionally accepted their rea-
sons and generally did not. The use of any saving on the budget was negotiated. Previously,
HealthCentreCo-ordinatorshadbeenfreetodecidetheuseofsavings;however,theFinan-
cial Manager had observed that substitutions of medical staff were the only use chosen, and
because of that sole use he then imposed some limits on the use of budget savings.
There was a legal reason why the centre should not devote this budget saving to staff
substitutes. The budget was a public matter regulated by Spanish law into particular budget
headings which made it very difﬁcult to move funds across budget headings. The Health
Centre Co-ordinators and the Financial Manager usually agreed to devote over 33% of the
saving for substitutions, 33% in training and the rest was decided by the co-ordinator. The
Financial Manager established these percentages based upon historical information. The
RegionalFinancialDepartmentalsowasmoreﬂexibleinallowingmorevariationsfromthe
anticipated expenses.
3.3.4. Low salaries and lack of interest in the new system
The Financial Manager observed that that the voluntary new system was not attractive
because the Health Centre personnel had high salaries with a comparatively small addition
formakingitamanagerialjob.(ThiswasconﬁrmedbyAnton,theco-ordinatorinterviewed.)
TheFinancialManagerobservedthattheco-ordinator,Anton,hadleftthehealthcaresystem
for health reasons. The Financial Manager considered that the incentive of having an extra
amountofmoney,freeforusingintheHealthCentre,shouldhaveactedasabiggerincentive
than it had been.
3.3.5. Less Health Centres in the new system than at the start of the study
ThisstudybeganinSeptember1999andchangesince,inDecember2001,wasthatthere
were less individuals and Health Centres involved in changes than in 1999.
At December 2001, there were 66 Health Centres at no level, 10 centres at Level 1, 1 at
Level 2 and 1 at Level 3. This meant that the Financial Manager had moved to Level 3 with
1 Health Centre, Level 2 with 1 Health Centre, Level 1 with 10 Health Centres and had 66
Health Centres at no level. These situations of 1998 and 2001 are in Table 2.
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Total numbers at different levels Health Centres/managers
Levels 1998 2001
No level 45 66
Level 1 30 10
Level 2 2 1
Level 3 – 1
Total 77 78
3.3.6. Movements relating to adoption of the new system with individual co-ordinators
and Health Centres during the study
During the course of this study there had been movements of the Health Cen-
tre Co-ordinators in relation to the adoption of the new system and accordingly the
Health Centres. From September 1999 until December 2001 the pathways followed
were:
1. Old system—Level 1 (1999) to Level 2 to Level 3 (2001): one Health Centre Manager.
2. Old system—Level 1 to Level 2 (1999, 2001): one Health Centre Manager.
3. Oldsystem—Level1toLevel2(1999)tooldsystem(2001):oneHealthCentreManager
that we interviewed left the system because of health reasons.
4. Old system—Level 1 (1999, 2001): 10 Health Centre Managers.
5. Old system—Level 1 (1999) to old system (2001): 19 Health Centre Managers.
6. Old system (1999, 2001): 45 Health Centre Managers.
7. Old system: one new Health Centre into the system.
3.4. Data collected from interview with Health Centre Co-ordinator—July 2000
3.4.1. Background
A schedule of questions was prepared, but the intention was to encourage a free conver-
sation in as many cases as possible. Essentially, Anton responded to these questions at a
meeting in July 2000. Anton was a doctor who had been in the Health Centre for 12 years
and had acted as co-ordinator since the introduction of co-ordinator, 9 years previously. On
becoming co-ordinator he received a small additional salary.
His principal functions as co-ordinator were: (1) to be a link between the senior
managerial level and the Health Centre colleagues, (2) to manage the different types of
healthcare—emergencies,preventionandpromotionofhealth,(3)tobeleaderofcolleagues
and a representative between the senior managers and the Health Centre administration.
The major change in the 9 years had been the system of nursing, which had improved
the running of the centre.
3.4.2. Activities and organization
The Health Centre was at the second level of change as it had agreed to move to Level 2,
1 year before. There was not much difference between Level 1 and the recently introduced
Level 2. Level 2 had not affected the majority of people in the centre and had not yet really
21becomerealforthem.Themajorityofpersonnelweretemporarysoitwasdifﬁcultforthem
to appreciate something that did not directly affect them.
Anton noted the centre offered a programme of healthcare including emergencies, den-
tal clinic, opthalmics, paediatrics, rehabilitation, maternity, social assistance and shortly
pharmacy. The centre was organised in a way which was similar to the running of other
HealthCentreswithitsworkofconsultationsandclinics.Therewerevariousmeetingswith
colleagues in different groups depending upon the matter.
The centre had an annual agreement with the Financial Manager about the anticipated
activities of the centre and the ﬁnancing of these. Anton had participated in the change
process since its introduction. The process started with a budget based on the previous
year’sexpendituresofthevariousactivities.Aspeciﬁcproblemhadoccurredwithsubstitute
personnel. In summer the population increased with tourists, so the centre needed more
people than normal because some personnel were on holiday. Anton had negotiated this
and more personnel and money had been achieved.
Anton was asked if he had much inﬂuence on the content of the activities and/or
the ﬁnance of the current agreement. He noted occasionally he had not agreed with the
budget, so he negotiated until there was a compromise, the issue of the substitute per-
sonnel was an example. Generally with other items, he did not know why one area of
expenditure suddenly increased. There were too many factors which affected these expen-
ditures, and with disposable materials he did not understand why expenditures in the
clinic had increased so much. Perhaps the emergencies had caused the increase, there




from the Regional Management. The accounting data came from the Regional Financial
Accounting systems, but it was not explained. Anton had discussed appropriate parts of this
data in meetings with those in the areas involved. Anton thought the data was acceptable, a
valid system and had nothing negative to observe about it. Anton considered he understood
the data provided and could use it, but at times he had to have it explained. He did not know




centre wanted to move to the idea that the budget related to the centre’s activities, because
the centre had its own ideas.
4. Analyses of ﬁndings
This section analyses the ﬁndings from the interactions with the Financial Manager for
the organization analysis in the ﬁrst subsection, and his views about his job and his views
about Health Centre Co-ordinators in the second subsection. The third subsection uses
materials from the interview with the Health Centre Co-ordinator. The section compares
22the ﬁndings with the theory for organizations in Section 2.2.7, for the Financial Manager
in Section 2.2.5 and the Health Centre Co-ordinator in Section 2.2.6.
4.1. Organization analysis of Health Centres
4.1.1. Before 1997—old system
The changes to the old system began in January 1997 before the study started. Prior to
January 1997 there were Health Centre Co-ordinators who were volunteers. The Financial
Manager indicated that these were not allowed to exercise any inﬂuence in the organization
in the formal sense. The individuals in the Health Centres appeared to be in a position of
No Inﬂuence. They also did not receive any information from the accounting system. They
were in a position of No Information.
The Financial Manager had a wide range of inﬂuence over the funds that the Health
Centres used. They were ﬁnanced with a ﬁxed amount, based upon the centre’s previous
activity,andavariableamount,basedupontheﬁnancingoftheagreedamountofadditional
activity with the senior Regional Managers. These senior managers discussed matters until
a budget was approved.
In these ways the Financial Manager (along with other Regional Managers) participated
inthesettingoftheactivitiesandbudgetsfortheseHealthCentres.Thebudgetwasallocated
in a ﬁctitious way amongst all the services inside the area, including the Health Centres.
The Financial Manager was in a position of Total Inﬂuence in ﬁnancial matters from the
perspective of the Health Centre. The Health Centres never received funds physically. The
Financial Manager had access to all of the accounting information about the centres. He
had Total Information.
The situation with the 77 Health Centres and the Financial Manager is represented in
the Health Centres Matrix of Information–Inﬂuence relating to the Health Centres with the
old system and shown in Fig. 6. The theoretical situation of Total Information and Total
Inﬂuence was not explicitly dealt with for this ﬁeld study. It has occurred and we have used
our Information–Inﬂuence Matrix approach to demonstrate its existence and position on an
extended Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
Fig. 6. Information–Inﬂuence positions in the Health Centres and the Financial Manager old system before 1997
Matrix.
234.1.2. From January 1997—new system begins
Thenewsystemstartedin1997andrequiredaperson,usuallyadoctor,toberesponsible
for a Health Centre. He had to be in the Health Centre for at least 7 hours a day, to have
enough time to perform his new job, as well as his medical tasks.
The Health Centre Co-ordinator, was the intermediary between the Financial Manager
andtheotherindividualsintheHealthCentre.TheHealthCentreCo-ordinatorinformedthe
Financial Manager of any problems that occurred. He was also responsible for organising
the activity in the centre, such as substitutions.
The participation of a Health Centre in the new system was voluntary. In order to attract
centres to adopt the new form and to get individuals to become co-ordinator, those who
participatedwererewardedwithadditionaladministrativeresources(staffforadministrative
tasks, computers, phone, etc.). Such resources let the doctors have more time for their
medical work. The Health Centre Co-ordinators also received a small addition to their
salary which was variable. The additional salary took into consideration the quantity and
the quality of the work. Further motivation was provided by the fact that the co-ordinator
knew the amount the centre was spending.
4.1.3. September 1999—our ﬁrst conversation
The new systems for Health Centres involved three levels of possible change for these
and the co-ordinators. At Level 1 the co-ordinator receives the three monthly statements of
expenditures and inventory movements, all decisions are made by the Financial Manager.
Level2theco-ordinatorreceivesthethreemonthlystatementsofexpendituresandinventory
movements,hassomeinﬂuenceovertheappointmentofpersonnelintheHealthCentreand
tries to control expenses. The co-ordinator also has some inﬂuence on how the centre will
use a part of the ‘savings’ on these expenditures, compared with the budget. Level 3 has the
same information received as Level 2, but the co-ordinator has more inﬂuence and a larger
amount of ‘savings’ on the budget to spend.
We spoke with the Financial Manager in September 1999 when he had negotiated with
30 centres to take up an agreement to work with Level 1 and with two centres to work at
Level 2. The agreement was discussed within each centre and signed by the centre and the
region. The agreement was voluntary, a Health Centre could take part at any level it wished,
and move up or down from this. These 77 organizations are in Fig. 7 and demonstrate the
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix position for Health Centres and the Financial Manager at
September 1999. Although the changes are underway the ultimate responsibility for all 77
centres stays with the Financial Manager.
Forty-ﬁve Health Centres were not involved in the new system and are shown in the
old system position of No Information–No Inﬂuence. The 30 Health Centre Managers at
Level 1 received accounting data regarding their monthly expenditures every 3 months, and
data about expenses and their inventory movements. The Financial Manager prepared that
informationinawaythatcouldbeunderstoodbyindividualsnotusedtoaccountingdata.The
aimwasthattheHealthCentreCo-ordinatorsknewtheirexpenses,makingtheco-ordinator
conscious of these. In this way their Health Centres moved from No Information to Local
Information. In terms of inﬂuence, the Financial Manager communicated the decisions that
affectedthecentretotheHealthCentreCo-ordinators.Thus,theymovedfrom NoInﬂuence
to Communication.
24Fig. 7. Information–Inﬂuence positions in the Health Centres and the Financial Manager in September 1999
Matrix.
InHealthCentresatLevel2,theHealthCentreCo-ordinatorscouldexertsomeinﬂuence
on the daily small running expenditures of the centre. After the co-ordinator produced a
budget, it was authorised by the Financial Manager, or not. With a very few decisions, the
Health Centre Co-ordinator moved from No Inﬂuence to Participation. However, in most
of the decisions he was in Consultation with the Financial Manager.
The Financial Manager provided the Health Centre Co-ordinators at Level 2 with the
sameinformationasthoseatLevel1.However,Level2HealthCentreCo-ordinatorsgained
access to medium information during the discussion process and so had Local Information
and Medium Information.
We have used a Health Centre Organization Matrix to show the position the position at
September 1999 by using the enlarged Matrix of Fig. 6. The changes found are consistent
with changes processes anticipated before the study.
4.1.4. December 2001—our last conversation
ByDecember2001theFinancialManagerhaddealtwiththenewsystematLevel3with
more inﬂuence on spending budget savings than at Level 2. It was known that the Level
4, the self-management level, a position of Autonomy or Sole Participation, was currently
impossible to attain. There were less Health Centres involved with the new systems than in
September 1999.
The Financial Manager had moved to Level 3 with one Health Centre, where its co-
ordinator had moved closer to Participation than he was at Level 2. The information had
not changed from Level 2. The one Health Centre that remained at Level 2 had slightly less
inﬂuence but was still in the Consultation position. There were 10 Health Centres at Level
1i nt h eCommunication position.
At this time, there were 66 Health Centres working with the old system. These positions
are shown on the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix of the Health Centres and the Financial
Manager in Fig. 8.
25Fig. 8. Information–Inﬂuence positions in the Health Centres and the Financial Manager in December 2001
Matrix.
4.1.5. Discussion concerning Health Centres
In comparison to 1999, 20 co-ordinators at Level 1 had diminished their inﬂuence by
moving to No Level, making 66 at the No Level and leaving 10 in the Communication
position. The one who remained at Level 2 had slightly less inﬂuence but was still in the
Consultation position. The co-ordinator at Level 3 had moved closer to Participation than
he was at Level 2. The information had not changed for the levels.
The Level 4 was the self-management level. The co-ordinator would be in a position
of Autonomy or Sole Participation. The Financial Manager considered that Level 4 was an
ideal condition, however, it was currently not possible to attain Level 4 with the current
lawsandhealthcarenorms.TheFinancialManagerthoughtthatforaHealthCentretoattain
Autonomy would be a utopia.
Overall the outcome of this Health Centre change programme does not appear to have
occurred in the ways anticipated by the central Spanish government, the Galician legis-
lation and the Financial Manager. We do not know the retos of the Financial Manager or
any co-ordinator. The change programme started in 1997 when all Health Centres were
with the old system at No Level, and apparently with no information and no inﬂuence.
In September 1999, at the ﬁrst interview, the Financial Manager noted 32 (out of 77)
Health Centres were involved with the new system. There were 30 at Level 1 and two at
Level 2. At the last interview in December 2001 there were 10 at Level 1, 1 at Level 2
and 1 at Level 3. The Galician legislation promoted the ideas of autonomy which would
be Level 4, but with the current laws and healthcare norms it was impossible to attain.
Thus the legislative sentiments about autonomy and the focus on Regional Autonomy in
26healthcare were not followed through with the appropriate conditions for this to occur at
Level 4.
The general lack of suitable conditions available for an autonomous Health Centre to
existmightbesomeofthereasonswhyprogresstowardsthenewsystemhasreversedduring
thetimeofourstudy.InSeptember1999therewere45withtheoldsystematnolevelandin
December 2001 there were 66 (with one additional Health Centre) with the old system. Our




Level 1. This suggests that the Financial Manager’s decision-making has ended in more or
lessthesamesituationthathewasinbeforetheproposedchanges.Hehadthistotalinﬂuence
and information in relation to 77 Health Centres before the changes in 1997 and 78 in Dec
2001. The position of the Financial Manager has apparently altered very little, irrespective
of the number of Health Centres he had worked with and started towards the new system.
The Financial Manager enjoyed having this degree inﬂuence over affairs, however, if
his retos had included the need to have most of the Health Centres at Level 2 within
3–4 years, then this has not occurred and therefore could have had unsettling implications
for him.
There were, then, only two cases where a co-ordinator had a little inﬂuence at Level 2
and some more inﬂuence at Level 3. At Level 2 the co-ordinator received guidance about
taking on new staff but was responsible for and inﬂuenced the personnel activities and
took joint-decisions with the Financial Manager about any budget ‘savings’. At Level 3
the co-ordinator had more freedom about the choice of personnel and a larger amount of
any budget ‘savings’. It was also found that the amount of discretion that the co-ordinator
had at Levels 2 and 3 had been reduced by the end of the study because the Financial
Manager noted that co-ordinator generally wanted to spend savings from the budget on
medical staff substitutions. This could not continue easily because of the legal deﬁnitions
of the budget headings and funds could not be transferred between these, they had to be
used for designated purposes.
Since the co-ordinator we had interviewed had left for health reasons, we were unable
to discuss matters with him a second time and acquire some further understandings of what
had happened.
Without interviews with other co-ordinator, it is impossible for us to advance many
reasons for the lack of Health Centres moving to new systems which might be associated
with the relationship with the Financial Manager.
IrrespectiveofthelackofsustainedchangetothenewsystemforHealthCentres,itwould
appearthattherealitiesofeverydaylifeweredifferenttothosebefore1997fortheFinancial
Manager. Then he had budgets for all Health Centres agreed only at the Regional Ofﬁce,
whereas with the proposed changes, after regional agreement there had been discussions
with many Health Centres about the amount of their budget. In this way if his retos had
been based upon the time spent on activities as opposed to outcomes then this could have
occurred with more acceptable implications for him.
Inrelationtothebudgetsavingsitwasnotedthatforaco-ordinatortoachieveanybudget
savings the objective would be to keep the activity at a Health Centre to a minimum. This
27seems an unusual way in which to organise healthcare especially in view of the assertions
of the Galician legislation about the beneﬁts of these proposed changes.
It was found that the new system was implemented through a voluntary agreement with
a Health Centre and that the Health Centre could vary this agreement to move up or down
the new system levels or to the old system. The adoption of the new system would have led
co-ordinators to receive a small additional salary and additional administrative resources
to allow doctors more time for medical work. These might be retos for a co-ordinator,
but have not been taken up by the majority. If we accept that medical staff could earn
higher remuneration outside of a Health Centre through private practice, then the additional
salary would be insufﬁcient for the majority of medical staff to move towards becoming a
co-ordinator.
When given a choice of usage of savings on the budget, the co-ordinator chose to sub-
stitute medical staff. This was not acceptable to the Financial Manager for legal reasons.
However, the co-ordinators’ choices/decisions may be indicative of need for a different
retos or with other matters in Health Centres of which we are unaware.
ItwasnotedthattoraisetheawarenessoftheLevel1co-ordinator,theFinancialManager
discussed the activities of a Health Centre and its ﬁnancial implications with them. At
this stage co-ordinators had no inﬂuence over decisions and such discussions could have
causedtheco-ordinatorsconcernbecausetheywereunabletoaffectthoseexpenditures.The
Financial Manager noted that he generally rejected the reasons given by the co-ordinators
to justify an increase in expenditures. These actions might be major reasons for the lack of
changes.
The arrangements for information to the Level 1 co-ordinators were centred around
accounting data about the last 3 months with expenses and stock movements. At Level
2, co-ordinators inﬂuenced the daily small expenditures, but a budget had to be produced
for each expenditure and authorised by the Financial Manager before it was incurred. This
occurredbecausetheFinancialManagerwouldnotallowtheco-ordinatorstospendwithout
a budget, and even then, the budget application was not always approved.
TheHealthCentrebudgetwasbasedonthepreviousyear’sactivitiesattheHealthCentre,
with consideration of the current and forecast activities, whilst the personnel, running and
disposable expenses were all negotiated. After this the co-ordinator was anticipated to keep
activities to a minimum to achieve a budget saving.
Mostofthemattersheredonotseemsoundlycarriedoutwiththesystems,legalsituation
and resources available. None were trained for any of these changes.
It seems that the reforms were proposed by the political institution of the Galician
RegionalGovernmentandcontainsGalicianaspirations.TheFinancialManagerresponsible
for the implementation of these changes in his division considered the reforms worthwhile
and initially was content about these. We may assume that his senior Regional Managers
were of a similar opinion in order for this Financial Manager to work in the way that he did.
WhentheFinancialManagertriedtoimplementthechanges,thereweresomeindividuals
in the Health Centres who were prepared to consider introducing some changes under the
currentcircumstances.Attheendofthestudythisoccurredwith10HealthCentresatLevel
1, 1 at Level 2 and 1 at Level 3, 15%. There were 85% of Health Centres at No Level. We
interpretthesetomeanthattherewassomeagreementaboutimplementingchangesinthese
12 Health Centres; however, after 4 years this had only progressed beyond the provision
28of data about the Health Centre Level 1, in two cases. These outcomes suggest that the
Galician institutional plans only match those of the medical doctors and other professionals
in these 12.
The implementation of the institutional reforms was not supported in appropriate ways.
There appears to have been no signiﬁcant increase in resources. There was no training for
the Financial Manager about the changes. The budget systems continued largely as before,
there were no incentive systems or new organizational decision-making processes for those
at the Health Centres. When the two or three Health Centre Co-ordinators did take part
beyond Level 1 and had the opportunity to take part in deciding how they wanted to spend
the “savings”, their ideas were not permissible under Spanish law. The Financial Manager
was upset that the anticipated changes to autonomy had not occurred and were not possible
under current Spanish law.
4.2. The Financial Manager
4.2.1. Introduction
This analysis begins after the start of the new system, when the Financial Manager was
managing some Health Centres under the old system and other Health Centres at various
stages with the new system. The Matrix analysis relates to the personal position that he was
in with a Health Centre under the old system and how he acted in his involvement with the
HealthCentreCo-ordinatorsinmovingaHealthCentretothenewsystem.Thissectionalso
analyses the Financial Manager’s views about the changes he has seen or anticipates in the
roleofaHealthCentreCo-ordinatorinmovingfromtheoldsystemtothenewsystem,atthe
level of the individual. Subsequently, the Financial Manager’s views about the co-ordinator
will be compared with the co-ordinator’s view.
4.2.2. Financial Manager and his Personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
The Financial Manager characterised his role and himself as having independence in
decision-making, with superiors listening and involving everyone in a common goal and
subordinates helping to solve the different problems that a Health Centre might face.
With the old system the Financial Manager was the person who controlled the non-
medical activities in the Health Centre and the budget for these. He considered himself as
the person controlling the situations at the Health Centres. Thus he was in a position of sole
control over all activities after discussing matters with his superiors. We might call this sole
participation in decisions or autonomy in decisions over a Health Centre.
TodemonstratethechangesweaccepttheexperiencesoftheFinancialManageraboutthe
sequence of inﬂuence and information that he has used in his work with the Health Centre
Co-ordinators to bring about change. These work positions are shown in the Financial
Manager’s personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix in Fig. 9.
The Financial Manager’s (FM) initial position on the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix is
one of Autonomy with the Local information for decisions. This initial position is shown
in Fig. 9 as FM 1. Although referred to as the initial position, it is a position which the
Financial Manager will continue to hold up to Level 3.
The Financial Manager noted that at Level 1 in the new system, a Health Centre Co-
ordinator is provided with ﬁnancial information about the amount spent. He noted that this
29Fig. 9. The Financial Manager’s (FM) experiences at Levels 1–3 about his sequence of work with co-ordinators,
shown as movements on an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
provision of ﬁnancial data to the Health Centre Co-ordinators started a dialogue between
the co-ordinator and himself about what the data meant, and what it could be used for. This
indicated that he was preparing to be less autonomous in relation to the Health Centre Co-
ordinatoratLevel1.TheﬁrststagewasforhimtobeinapositionofCommunicationwitha
Health Centre Co-ordinator providing the Financial Manager with Local Information. The
Financial Manager took the decisions. This ﬁrst stage is shown as FM 2 in Fig. 9.
With the second stage, the co-ordinator was moving from the Communication position
to the Consultation position. The Financial Manager took decisions after considering the
Health Centre Co-ordinator’s views. This second stage is shown as FM 3 in Fig. 9.
In the third stage, the Financial Manager noted that at Level 2 the co-ordinator also had
detailsofpersonnelcapacityforthecentreandoftheamountoftheunspentpre-determined
budget. The Health Centre Co-ordinators received guidance about taking on new staff but
otherwisethecentre’sactivitiesweretheirresponsibility.InthiswaytheFinancialManager
wouldhavemovedfrombeinginconsultationwithaco-ordinatortobeinginaparticipative
situation with Local Information and some decisions.
Also at this third stage is a participative situation of Level 3 where the co-ordinator was
able to spend a larger amount of the budget savings than at Level 2. Thus both Level 2 and
3 occur at this stage are appear as FM 4 in Fig. 9.
The Financial Manager had found Level 4 and autonomy legally impossible currently,
however, this had been discussed and he gave his anticipations about this, which can be
compared with our theory. He anticipated that as the participation with a co-ordinator grew
towards autonomy, the Financial Manager would have essentially no inﬂuence with the
HealthCentreCo-ordinatorinthedailyrunningofaffairs.Hewouldnolongerbelocatedon
the same Information–Inﬂuence Matrix, since he would no longer be involved in the daily
running of the Health Centre. He would now have a different inﬂuence and information
relationship with a Health Centre Co-ordinator. This different information and inﬂuence
relationship is shown as FM 5 in Fig. 10, a new Matrix to demonstrate the start of a new
relationship.
These same materials about Levels 1–3 are used to analyse the Financial Manager’s
positions of inﬂuence and information in relation to a Health Centre, as shown in Fig. 11.
30Fig. 10. Anticipated position of the Financial Manager after Health Centre Manager achieves Autonomy at Level
4 Matrix—Financial Manager’s view.
He starts with autonomy and local information as FM 1, in Fig. 11, making all decisions
about the Health Centre.
This autonomous situation continues whilst he is interacting with the co-ordinator at the
communication stage, FM 2, and the consultation stage, FM 3. He will only appear to lose
this autonomy once he starts joint-decision-making and moves to participation, FM 4.
4.2.3. Comparison of Financial Manager’s views on his Personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix with the theoretical Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
AcomparisonismadebetweenthetheoreticalMatrixofFig.2containingtheanticipated
movements of a Financial Manager in relation to the process of change with a co-ordinator
and the actual views of the Financial Manager represented in Fig. 9. There are differences.
Fig. 11. The Financial Manager’s experiences at Levels 1–3 about his changes in the Information–Inﬂuence
Matrix—relating to a Health Centre.
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by moving from autonomy into participation, then consultation, communication and into
a different relationship. This is not completely in agreement with the Financial Manager’s
view.
The Financial Manager indicates that he would retain autonomy over Health Centre
decisions until the co-ordinator starts to participate in joint-decisions, when the Financial
Managerwouldbeinaparticipativesituation.Untilthattimehewouldbeinanautonomous
position.
The theoretical Matrix was correct to anticipate the movement from autonomy to par-
ticipation for the Financial Manager, but in practice this occurred through the Financial
Managerexperiencingcommunication,consultationandparticipationwiththeco-ordinator.
This order is the reverse of the anticipated order.
These ﬁndings indicate the need to revise the theoretical Matrix to make clear the con-
tinued autonomy of the Financial Manager until the co-ordinator takes over and to note the
correct order in which changes in inﬂuence have occurred.
ThetheoreticalMatrixalsoindicatedaﬁfthstage,adifferentrelationshipfortheFinancial
Managerandtheco-ordinatoronaseparateMatrix,onceautonomyoccurred.Althoughthis
autonomy currently was impossible, the Financial Manager had anticipated such a change.
He anticipated this different relationship to be one where he received the total budget data
about the Health Centre and its anticipated savings. This means that the theoretical Matrix
oftheanticipatedpositionoftheFinancialManagerafteraHealthCentreManagerachieves
autonomy, Fig. 3, and the Financial Manager’s own view are identical to his anticipated
Matrix in Fig. 10.
4.2.4. Financial Manager’s views related to a Framework of Issues
Asnotedintheprevioussubsection,theﬁndingsontheMatrixoftheFinancialManager’s
actual change processes, in relation to a co-ordinator and represented in Fig. 9, are different
to the theoretical. Accordingly these ﬁndings are now stated in terms of a Framework of
Issues for the Financial Manager, in relation to a Health Centre Co-ordinator, being the
interpretation of the Information–Inﬂuence Matrix shown in Fig. 9.
1. Started in the Local Information—Autonomy, FM 1.
2. In working with the Health Centre Co-ordinator, at Level 1, the Financial Manager pro-
videdtheco-ordinatorwithLocalInformationanddecisionsindicatingaCommunication
position, FM 2. Financial Manager is still Autonomous.
3. With the start of discussions the Financial Manager moved from the Communication
position to the Consultation position of taking decisions after considering the Health
Centre Co-ordinator’s views, FM 3. Financial Manager is still Autonomous.
4. When matters progressed, the Financial Manager worked from consultation with the
co-ordinator to making participative joint-decisions with the co-ordinator sharing Local
Information and decisions, FM 4. The Financial Manager is now in the participation
stage in Fig. 9, with less autonomy.
5. As the change process came to its conclusion for co-ordinator, the Financial Manager
moved into the position of Local Health Centre Information and Communication. FM 5
in Fig. 10.
32When comparing the above Framework of Issues with the theoretical Framework of
Issues, items 1 and 5 are the same, but the means of moving from item 1 to 5 were the
reversed in practice to that theoretically proposed. Also, the theory needs to be clear that
the Financial Manager’s autonomy still exists even with Level 3 centres.
4.2.5. Financial Manager’s views about the changes for a Health Centre Co-ordinator
represented on a Personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
The changes for a Health Centre Co-ordinator are based on the Financial Manager’s
views about his experiences of change and his anticipations about what would happen if
autonomy became possible. The detailed notions were discussed in the previous subsection
in relation to the Financial Manager and are not repeated. The objective for the Financial
Manager was to change the way in which Health Centres were managed by getting Health
Centre staff to agree to implement the new system.
With the old system there was a co-ordinator, who received no information about the
expenditures on daily activities and had no inﬂuence over these expenditures. Expressed
in the context of a personal Matrix for the co-ordinator, the co-ordinator (HCC) was
considered to have No Information and No Inﬂuence before the start of the new system.
This is represented as HCC 1 in Fig. 12. Fig. 12 is composed of the Financial Manager’s
anticipations about changes with autonomy as well as his experience of changes with the
new system relating to a co-ordinator.
With change at Level 1 a co-ordinator was provided with information about the expendi-
tures of the Health Centre and was shown that the activities of his colleagues did affect the
amount spent. This put a co-ordinator into a position of Communication from the Financial
Manager, who provided a co-ordinator with details of the Local Information and the deci-
sions taken by the Financial Manager. At the position of Level 1 the co-ordinator was in the
positionofLocalInformationandCommunication.ThisisrepresentedasHCC2inFig.12.
With the Level 2 agreement the co-ordinator was provided with data about the spent
budget and unspent budget. He was also more involved in discussions with the Financial
Fig. 12. The Financial Manager’s experiences at Levels 1–3, and anticipations at Level 4 about a Health Centre
Co-ordinator’s changing role in relation to the daily running of a Health Centre and the changes in information
and inﬂuence for a co-ordinator, shown as movements on a co-ordinator’s Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
33Manager about the decisions the Financial Manager took concerning daily activities. The
co-ordinator was becoming more inﬂuential over the Financial Manager’s decisions. The
co-ordinator moved from the Communication position to being consulted in relation to the
Financial Manager. This is Local Information and Consultation the situation as at HCC 3
in Fig. 12.
As the ability of the co-ordinator developed so he started to take joint decisions with the
Financial Manager and moved to the participation position. This occurred at Levels 2 and
3, where the co-ordinator received Local Information and was in a Participation position
with the Financial Manager, represented by HCC 4 in Fig. 12.
Finally, if the co-ordinator could become responsible for the Health Centre and able to
take decisions alone, then the co-ordinator would be in the position of Local Information
and Autonomy. This last stage is represented as HCC 5 in Fig. 12.
4.2.6. Comparison of the Financial Manager’s views about the changes for a Health
Centre Co-ordinator represented on a personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix with the
theoretical Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
This comparison is between the theoretical anticipated movements of a Health Centre
Manager represented in Fig. 4 and those experienced and anticipated by the Financial
Manager in Fig. 12. The two Matrices are the same, no differences were found and the
theoretical view representation has been veriﬁed.
4.2.7. Financial Manager’s views about the Health Centre Co-ordinator related to a
Framework of Issues
The ﬁndings are now stated in terms of a Framework of Issues for the Health Centre
Co-ordinatorusingtherepresentationontheInformation–InﬂuenceMatrixshowninFig.12.
1. Initially the co-ordinator was considered to have No Information and No Inﬂuence,
HCC 1.
2. On being provided with information the co-ordinator was in the position of Local
Information and Communication, HCC 2.
3. With more inﬂuence over the Financial Manager’s decisions, the co-ordinator moved to
the Local Information and Consultation situation, HCC 3.
4. The ability of the co-ordinator developed, he took joint decisions with the Financial
Manager and moved to the Local Information and Participation position, HCC 4.
5. When the co-ordinator became responsible for the Health Centre he was in the position
of Local Information and Autonomy, HCC 5.
A comparison of the above Framework of Issues, items 1–5, with the theoretical Frame-
work of Issues, items 1–5, are the same and the theoretical stages of changes have been
veriﬁed.
4.3. Health Centre Co-ordinator’s views
4.3.1. Introduction
The co-ordinator Anton characterised his role and himself as having at least three rela-
tionships with a personal Information and Inﬂuence Matrix. His work was with all of the
Health Centre’s activities, with the budgets set and the expenditures incurred.
34Fig. 13. Anton’s Health Centre Co-ordinator’s experiences at Levels 1 and 2 about his changing role in relation
to the daily running of the Health Centre and the changes in information and inﬂuence for a co-ordinator, shown
as movements on his Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
4.3.2. Health Centre Co-ordinator’s views and his Personal Information–Inﬂuence
Matrix
To represent Anton’s personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix shown in Fig. 13, we used
three of the areas of inﬂuence and information that Anton mentioned about stafﬁng and
disposables,andnothingelse.Thisistoillustratehispositionandhasnotattemptedtoenter
into all areas.
Anton appears to have received a lot of information about stafﬁng and has discussed this
forsometimewiththeFinancialManager,evenbeforethenewsystembegan.Withstafﬁng,
Anton is considered to be in the Local Information and Consultation position as shown by
Anton 1 in Fig. 13.
In the second relationship, disposable materials, he has received information that indi-
cates the expenditure is rising, but he can only express an opinion about it. Here he is
considered to be in the Local Information and Communication position as shown by Anton
2i nFig. 13.
In the third relationship he has no information about the causes of the increased expen-
diture on the disposable materials and cannot inﬂuence the use of disposables. This is
considered to be a situation of No Information and No Inﬂuence, because he cannot express
an opinion. This is shown as Anton 3 in Fig. 13.
4.3.3. Comparison of Health Centre Co-ordinator’s views on his Personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix with the theoretical co-ordinator’s
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
The comparison is between the theoretical anticipated movements of a Health Centre
Co-ordinator represented on a Matrix in Fig. 4, and the actual views of the co-ordinator
in Fig. 13. Anton was in a process of change in the new system at Level 2. In his
work he reported having no information and no inﬂuence at times, whilst also reporting
using local information in situations of communication and consultation. Anton’s Matrix
is within the theoretical notions outlined for a co-ordinator progressing in the new sys-
tem. His views have veriﬁed the activities being undertaken to move the new system
35and also a large part of the theoretical constructions with Level 2, local information and
consultation.
4.3.4. Health Centre Co-ordinator’s views related to a Framework of Issues
In terms of the Framework of Issues the effect of these changes on the personal Matrix
of the Health Centre Co-ordinator are as follows:
1. In the third relationship Anton 3 was in the No Information–No Inﬂuence position.
2. In the second relationship Anton 2 is located in the Local Information–Communication
position.
3. IntheﬁrstrelationshipAnton1islocatedintheLocalInformation–Consultationposition.
These three stages are consistent with those ﬁrst three stages stated in theoretical Frame-
work of Issues. Clearly Anton has different relationships with information and inﬂuence
depending upon the area. This is consistent with what we anticipated.
4.3.5. Comparison of Health Centre Co-ordinator’s views on his personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix with the Financial Manager’s views about a
co-ordinator represented on an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
This comparison is between the co-ordinator’s views as represented in his personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix in Fig. 13 and the views of the Financial Manager about the
changes with a co-ordinator represented by an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix in Fig. 12.
Anton provided evidence about his experiences up to and including at Level 2. These
covered having no information and no inﬂuence at times, whilst also reporting using local
information in situations of communication and consultation, represented in Fig. 13. These
views are consistent with those represented by the Financial Manager in Fig. 12 showing
the process of the new system with a co-ordinator starting with no information and no
inﬂuence and moving to local information and communication and then local information
and consultation at Level 2. Thus the views of the Financial Manager and the co-ordinator
are similar and consistent with the general movement towards the new system. They both
verify the theoretical Matrix for a co-ordinator.
4.4. Implications of the empirical evidence for the authors’ theoretical approach
4.4.1. Introduction
Our previous papers set out our theoretical approaches to study changing information
and inﬂuence in the context of new systems that were to be introduced into the Galician
Health Centres. This theory considered information and inﬂuence in the form of personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrices for a Financial Manager for a Health Centre Co-ordinator
and for the Health Centres as organizations. Finally there were theoretical perspectives in
three different areas that required empirical evidence (Purdy and Gago, in press).
The theoretical approaches underpinning this paper have been used since the 1980s and
the general approaches to study change in Galician Health Centres were set down (Purdy
and Gago, 2003) before we conducted our ﬁrst conversation with the Financial Manager in
September 1999. In 1999 we were given access to the legal and administrative details, so
we extended our notions to conform to these and so make our approach one that constituted
36the Galicianization of the theory (Purdy and Gago, in press). It is the Galicianized version
of the theory that we are comparing with our empirical materials.
Theobjectiveofthispaperistoevaluatetheevidencecollectedandrelatethistobothour
own theoretical approaches and later to the approaches others. The three different areas are
considered here: the Health Centre Organizations, a Financial Manager and third a Health
Centre Co-ordinator.
4.4.2. Health Centre Organizations
The empirical data established that Galician Health Centres operate with a Financial
Manager who administered 77 then 78 centres. Further, before January 1997 there was an
old system but since January 1997 a new system had been available for those at each centre
toadopt.Thisstartingdatewas21monthsbeforeourﬁrstconversation.Itwaspossiblefora
centretomoveintoparticularpartsofthenewsystemthroughagreementwiththeFinancial
Manager, and also to return to the old system if desired. The legal understanding of the new
system indicated that each Health Centre would become autonomous and that a Financial
Manager would gradually lose his inﬂuence over running the centre as a co-ordinator took
up this work.
The Financial Manager considered his position with the old system in administering
the Health Centres to be one of “Total Information” and “Total Inﬂuence”. In this paper
our basic Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix is in Fig. 1. It contains Information con-
structsofNoInformation,LocalInformation,MediumInformationandDistantInformation,
and, Inﬂuence constructs of No Inﬂuence, Communication, Consultation, Participation and
Autonomy. The ﬂexibility of these constructs, however, has permitted “Total Information”
and“TotalInﬂuence”tobeadmittedtotherelevantconstructsofthebasicGalicianMatrixto
form a new Matrix, Fig. 6.I nFig. 6, the Financial Manager’s Information–Inﬂuence Matrix
showshisTotalInformationandTotalInﬂuencerelationshiptothe77HealthCentresbefore
January 1997, and, that those Health Centres have No Information and No Inﬂuence.
This ﬂexibility to add these constructs is straightforward because the basic approach
encourages ﬂexibility as it aims to deal with every Information and Inﬂuence situation for
individuals and organization. Our ﬁrst theory paper noted that amongst other notions Total
Inﬂuence could exist, but Purdy (1987) had chosen not to incorporate this into a Matrix as it
indicated a situation of power to take decisions without any obvious inﬂuence from others.
It was also noted that All Information could exist but was unlikely for most individuals
(Purdy and Gago, 2003).
The theory clearly works for the organizational situation because the empirical evidence
has allowed the creation of Matrices to show the situations with the Health Centres also at
October 1990 – Fig. 7 and December 2001 – Fig. 8. Concentrating on the situation at the
end of the study in December 2001, Fig. 8 encompassed that the Financial Manager still
had Total Information and Total Inﬂuence over all 78 centres. Fig. 8 also demonstrates the
situation with the centres. One centre of Level 3 at Participation, one centre of Level 2 at
consultation, 10 centres of Level 1 at communication and 66 centres at No Information and
No Inﬂuence under the old system. After 5 years of opportunity, 85% of centres had chosen
to work with the old system.
The associated movement of information and inﬂuence on the Matrix, using the theoret-
ical Health Centres Framework of Five Issues, was conﬁrmed as correct by the experience
37of the Financial Manager for the items 1–4, moving from No Information and No Inﬂuence
to Local Information and subsequently Communication, Consultation, then Participation.
With item 5, Autonomy, it was not currently legally possible, but the Financial Manager
noted this had been discussed and he provided his anticipations about this last stage. His
view conﬁrmed our theoretical view.
4.4.3. Financial Manager
TheevidencefromtheFinancialManagerindicatedthatanInformation–InﬂuenceMatrix
could be constructed about his work, Fig. 9. Fig. 9 shows the three levels of the new system
with which he has worked and the Inﬂuence that he has exhibited with the co-ordinators.
This has been compared with the theoretical movements of a Financial Manager in relation
to a co-ordinator, in Fig. 2. The position of the Financial Manager in both Matrices started
with Local Information and Autonomy, however, the actual movement of the Financial
Manager was to Communication, Consultation and then Participation with a co-ordinator.
The theoretical order was into Participation, Consultation and ﬁnally Communication. In
view of this the theory here needs to be revised to the actual path of the Financial Manager.
The previous subsection noted why the Financial Manager could only provide his dis-
cussed anticipations about his likely situation after a Health Centre and its co-ordinator
achieved Autonomy. He noted that he would be in a different relationship with the co-
ordinator, with the co-ordinator reporting to him, and this is shown in Fig. 10. When this is
compared with the theoretical position of Fig. 3, they appear to be same. Thus parts of the
theory have been conﬁrmed but some need amending.
The associated movement of information and inﬂuence on the Matrix, using the the-
oretical Financial Manager’s Framework of Five Issues, was conﬁrmed as correct by the
experienceoftheFinancialManagerfortheitems1Autonomyand5Differentrelationship.
The theoretical movements of item 2 – Participation, 3 – Consultation and 4 – Communi-
cation were incorrect and should be of item 2 – Communication, 3 – Consultation and 4 –
Participation. It should be noted that the Financial Manager went through the same stages
as the theory but in a reverse order. So the theory needs to be revised to the actual order.
4.4.4. Health Centre Co-ordinator
ThetheoreticalmovementsofaHealthCentreCo-ordinatoronanInformation–Inﬂuence
Matrix appear in Fig. 4. We obtained two sets of data which corroborated our theoretical
view. The Financial Manager’s experiences with Levels 1–3 conﬁrmed the movement of a
co-ordinator from No Information and No Inﬂuence through Local Information and Com-
munication, Consultation and then Participation. As noted earlier, the Financial Manager
provided his anticipations about Autonomy, and all of these are represented in Fig. 12.I n
this way the changes of Fig. 12 are the same as the theoretical shown in theoretical co-
ordinator Matrix Fig. 4. The theory is veriﬁed with experience as far as participation, and
anticipations concerning Autonomy.
The co-ordinator’s experiences are represented in his personal Matrix of Fig. 13. The
co-ordinator experienced only Levels 1 and 2 and with these conﬁrmed the actual views of
the Financial Manager, Fig. 12 and the theoretical Fig. 4.
The associated movement of information and inﬂuence on the Matrix, using the theoret-
icalco-ordinator’sFrameworkofFiveIssues,wasconﬁrmedascorrectbytheexperienceof
38the Financial Manager for the items 1–4, and by the co-ordinator for the items 1–3. Item 5,
the move to Autonomy was anticipated by the Financial Manager and veriﬁed in that way.
4.5. Implications of ﬁndings to authors’ norms, previously cited studies and other work
4.5.1. Authors’ norms
The implications of our ﬁndings for our theoretical approach have been discussed, so
the other relevant ﬁndings are discussed here. The ﬁndings will be considered in relation
to the authors’ norms, then the relevant previous studies already cited (Purdy and Gago, in
press) and ﬁnally other literature relating the organizational ﬁndings to a wider context. In
particular comparisons are made with a study of operational museum change in Canadian
localgovernment.ThisistodevelopmoreinsightsintotheoutcomeoftheGalicianchanges.
Galician institutional plans for the Health Centres to change to a new system had been
matched by medical and professional staff in 12 out of 78 centres. Of these, 10 centres were
at the communication stage – Level 1, one at the consultation stage – Level 2 and one at the
participation stage – Level 3.
The previous paper demonstrated our research position and accepted the Galician legal
anticipations at face value as we construed these. Our personal Information and Inﬂuence
Matrices for a Financial Manager and Health Centre Co-ordinator, and, an organizational
Information and Inﬂuence Matrix for Health Centres, along with appropriate Frameworks
of Issues, incorporated our norms which accepted the overall optimistic narratives about
change(PurdyandGago,inpress).WefoundsimilaroptimismfromtheFinancialManager,
who eventually became very frustrated at the failure of the system to be able to bring about
change. We accepted his views. In this respect there were similarities between us.
A basic part of the legislation for the new system was that Health Centres would be able
to achieve autonomy. Although the possibilities about autonomy had been discussed by the
FinancialManagerwithcolleagues,thecurrentSpanishlawspreventedthisfromoccurring.
Perhaps this disappearance of a main objective has discouraged staff from taking part.
The Financial Manager’s anticipations about changes in the administration of Health
Centres included more cooperation with Health Centres and saw their co-ordinator as a link
betweenthestaffinthecentresandRegionalManagement.Perhapsthiswasnotappropriate
for Health Centre staff.
The Financial Manager indicated that when he commenced change with a co-ordinator,
there was communication of his decisions about the daily activities and the provision of
data concerning the amount spent by the Health Centre. From the context of information
provision, this amended situation could be an unsettling experience for the co-ordinator.
The co-ordinator was being told about decisions over which he had no control and also told
about the cost of these decisions, which he could not affect. This does not appear to be
very satisfactory for any co-ordinator to be in this situation as it could produce a sense of a
lack of control. This could be another strong reason why co-ordinator withdrew and most
centres not to start the new system.
There was also the fact that there were no additional resources for these new systems. In
this new system, at Level 2 and beyond, budgets were prepared for each centre and agreed
with a co-ordinator. One objective of the new system was to make “savings” on the budget
and allow co-ordinator at Level 2 have some inﬂuence in how this would be used. In three
39centres that, at some time during the study, had worked at Level 2 this opportunity had been
available. The co-ordinators had preferred to use these savings with staff substitutions, but
this was difﬁcult for the Financial Manager to agree to because the Spanish hypothecated
tax system did not permit discretionary spending outside of a category. Maybe the new
system was aimed at saving money. Perhaps these were strong reasons for co-ordinator not
to advance in the system or for the majority of centres to continue with the old system.
Another apparent problem with the new system was that medical staff would only
have a small increase in their salary for becoming an administrator, but would have more
administrative resources, particularly computers, to release time for medicine.
In the previous paper, the retos of legislation was considered an intangible, qualitative,
developmental aspect of life, likely to be difﬁcult to carry out and a stimulus in the work
area. We anticipated receiving details about the various retos in operation with different
people and situations, but retos were not mentioned. Perhaps the implied retos, for all of
those involved with Health Centres, was to work harder without additional resources or
pay to achieve the Galician legal aspiration. Perhaps the Financial Manager considered the
project of change to a new system as retos for himself.
At the start of the ﬁeld study, it was arranged that we would be given access to some
co-ordinator at different levels. When it ﬁnished in December 2001, despite the best efforts,
accesshadbeendeniedtomorethanoneco-ordinator.Therelevanceofonlyoneco-ordinator
needs to be considered in context. First, in relation to the numbers involved, at the end there
were there were only two co-ordinator who had reached level two, indicating consultation,
apart from Anton, the one who had been interviewed and had subsequently left the service.
Thus we had interviewed a third of the people who had been involved at Level 2, and these
ﬁndings conﬁrmed the work of the Financial Manager and his views, as well as our own
theory. It is correct that there were 10 co-ordinator at Level 1, communication, and these
may have added some different insights if some had been interviewed, but all would have
been at a lower level than we had obtained materials for.
Onefurtheraspectabouttheinterviewwiththeco-ordinatoristhatweworkwithpersonal
construct psychology and its emphasis on the individual. In our view this one co-ordinator
has provided us with appropriate evidence about the situation of such an individual under-
taking the new system at Level 2. That interview has provided sufﬁcient evidence for our
study which was designed to be combined with the Financial Manager. It has also been
some corroboration of the Financial Manager’s views.
4.5.2. Previously cited studies
Almost all organization studies are different in their underpinning. For this paper our
collection of data was aimed at collecting personal views and factual views to use with our
theoretical approaches. These speciﬁc requirements make it difﬁcult to make very simple
comparisons with other studies and vice versa. A US study dealt with various attributes of
performance and involvement by the team members. Teams performed best when members
took part in setting the measurement targets and received more compensation (Scott and
Teissen, 1999). In Galicia, Level 2 and 3 agreements between the Health Centre and the
Financial Manager determined their activities and their budgets and involved very little or
no change in remuneration. Any budget savings were limited to speciﬁc areas of use and
not used completely as co-ordinator wanted.
40Some ﬁndings were similar to those of the UK Centre for Decision-Making Studies
(1979) showing that Galician management controlled the information provision process.
The Health Centre Co-ordinator indicated the potential changes which might be fostered
in centres with employee information provision and the related inﬂuence on decisions. He
noted that some appropriate data was used in some meetings that he had held with his
colleagues.
The Financial Manager indicated his agreement with and commitment to the proposed
changestowardstheprovisionofinformationtotheHealthCentreCo-ordinatorandgradual
greater inﬂuence of the co-ordinator on the daily running of the centre. This was similar
to the views of Goodlad and the lower and middle UK managers’ willingness to make
informationavailableandalterthesystemofitsbudgetusewithemployees(Goodlad,1984).
In the Goodlad study the changes did not start because senior managers did not permit this.
In Galicia the changes did not start in 45 Health Centres, this was not due to the senior
managers, but more likely because, it was impossible with Spanish law to have autonomy,





the Health Centre, a more “open” form of data provision and management, and similar to
that previously found with large UK companies (Purdy and Gago, in press).
The Galician legal aspirations had been prevented by Spanish law and health policies.
ThesedifferencesaresimilartotheEuropeanEconomicCommunity’sformulationofpolicy
about information provision to employees and their involvement especially with participa-
tion. During the early stages of its development, the notions promoted were of employee
participation, however, participation was excluded from the ﬁnal Directive (European
Communities Commission, 1994).
Arnold found US companies apparently created autonomy and employee involvement
in the late 1980s, but this was subsequently rescinded in the early 1990s. She noted that this
excursion into autonomy was really intensiﬁed Taylorism (Arnold, 1999). In the 5 years
coveredhere,autonomywasnotlegallypossible.WedidﬁndthatthemajorityoftheHealth
Centres, 45, had not moved from old system, whilst 21 moved to Level 1 and then rejected
this and returned to old system. Overall approximately 85% had no changed arrangements
after 5 years.
Arnold noted that the ending of the autonomy schemes destroyed trust. We cannot say
what has happened because the Spanish law prevented moves to autonomy. Not withstand-
ing, perhaps this lack of suitable legislation has allowed staff in many Health Centres to
have experienced a lack of trust.
4.5.3. Other studies
This Galician episode is a study in change relating to a section’s Financial Manager,
wherehisHealthCentreCo-ordinators,wouldhavetakentheresponsibilityfordealingwith
non-medical matters moving towards consultation and eventual autonomy. The employees
oftheHealthCentre,inwhichtheyworked,wouldhavedecidedtochangeitsadministrative
processestothenewsystem.Infactthishasonlyoccurredinafewcentres.Wearedependent
41upon the views of a Financial Manager about the reasons for these events and seek other
studies to help improve our insights about the organizational.
Armstrong comments on the situation with groups of workers, “cell proprietors”,
involved in change in a manufacturing company. He noted the workers did not have any
property rights but they did have responsibility for confronting the competition and sat-
isfying customers. These matters were ‘responsible autonomy’, a control strategy which
includedﬂexibleworking.Heclariﬁedthistobeoperatingattwolevels,thehighercompany
levels where there was freedom to ﬁnd new ways of achieving company objectives, whilst
the lower levels were free to ﬁnd new ways of achieving the targets derived from the higher
company levels (Armstrong, 2006).
It would seem that the Financial Manager and perhaps some of the Galician medical
health practitioners had been involved in searches for new ways of delivering the new
systems, so that a minority were doing that. Perhaps these were at the higher organizational
leveloftheRegionalDirectors,sincewefoundnoevidenceofretos,ortargets,oradditional
information about speciﬁc changes in objectives.
ThepaperbyOakesetal.(1998)consideredthetheoreticalpositionofpersonnelinvolved
in Alberta’s museum service. They noted the curators in the Museum Division constituted
a curatorial profession and were recognised as the technical personnel that constituted the
taken-for-grantedelementsofculturalcapitalofthatﬁeld.Ifthatprofessioncouldnolonger
holdontothisbodyofknowledge,theﬁeldwouldbecomeopentoquestion,thenthecultural
capital of the ﬁeld would be lost (Oakes et al., 1998).
WecanexplainthemovementsandthelackofmovementsoftheGalicianmedicalhealth
practitioners, using those theoretical concepts used by Oakes et al., if we accept that these
practitioners constitute a profession in the same sense used by Oakes et al. (1998). There
were 12 Health Centres that had adopted the new system, perhaps the new systems did
not present these practitioners with any matters which they considered as a threat to their
professional work. One Health Centre each had embarked on some Level 2 and Level 3
activities, whilst 10 had moved to Level 1.
Ontheotherhand,usingthesameconcepts,perhapsthemajorityoftheGalicianmedical
health practitioners considered that changing to the new system would create changes in
their professional ﬁeld and capital which they considered unacceptable. One Health Centre
had moved to the Level 2 before returning to old system, 19 had achieved the ﬁrst level but
thenreturnedtooldsystem,whilst46,including1newcentre,hadnotmovedandremained
at old system.
There is further theory from Oakes et al. that is helpful to explain our ﬁndings. They
consideredtheMuseumDivisionasaﬁeldofrestrictedproduction,andthatsuchﬁeldswere
relativelyautonomousastheirorientationwasprimarilyinternal.Therewascircularityhere
because the ﬁeld had the cultural capital to control its own internal processes and criteria,
which in turn allowed those working in the ﬁeld to have greater autonomy over what
constituted their work (Oakes et al., 1998).
In our study, the Galician medical health practitioners may be considered to constitute
a ﬁeld of restricted production, where they were autonomous in their activities and were
primarily internally focussed. In 66 Health Centres they used this autonomy to prevent
change to the new system and in 12 there were some new systems. This would indicate a
different type of autonomy already exists.
42In their conclusions, Oakes et al. draw attention to the matter of generalisations across
different actual ﬁelds; however, they consider in all ﬁelds there are similarities as they all
involve the manoeuvrings over positions and capital, and that ﬁnally, actors are complicit in
their own control and can change themselves and what is valued in their ﬁeld of operation
(Oakes et al., 1998).
Allofthesematterswouldappeartobeactiveinourstudy,wheresomeGalicianmedical
health practitioners have moved towards the new systems, but the majority have not.
5. Summary and conclusions
The authors are interested in the ways accounting information and the inﬂuence asso-
ciated with accounting information, are used in organizations by the individuals involved.
They became aware of impending changes to Galician Health Centres with the use of
centre co-ordinator to facilitate the eventual autonomy of the centre in relation to the
Regional Health Authority. Two earlier papers provided our theoretical antecedents for
a study of change in three areas involving an individual Financial Manager’s personal
Information–Inﬂuence Matrix, a co-ordinator’s personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix and
anorganizationalHealthCentresInformation–InﬂuenceMatrix.Eachofthesechangeareas
were theoretically anticipated and placed into stages through a Framework of Five Issues
for the three areas (Purdy and Gago, 2003, in press).
This paper provides the brief theoretical setting to these three areas, presents the collec-
tion of data, between September 1999 and December 2001, from a Financial Manager and
a Health Centre Co-ordinator, then analyses these materials and relates the ﬁndings ﬁrst
to our own theoretical approaches, and second to the approaches of others. Our agreement
with the Financial Manager was to discuss matters with an appropriate number of centre
co-ordinators in the new system. There was no agreement to discuss with any personnel in
the old system. The theory was concerned with change in these three areas with the intro-
duction of the new system, and the interactions of a Financial Manager and a co-ordinator,
and consequently the total outcomes for all Health Centres in the new system.
Our conversational methods secured the data required, which we were able to interpret
in terms of information and inﬂuence for all three areas on the appropriate Information
and Inﬂuence Matrices and for the Frameworks of Five Issues. Again these basic theoreti-
cal approaches have been validated as constructions which have a usefulness in everyday
situations, here with Galician managers.
The speciﬁc theoretical approaches were stated as the stages of progress with changes in
each item of a Framework of Issues. These very largely have been supported and certainly
to the extent that current Spanish legislation allowed changes to occur. The depth of the
analysisforeachMatrixandFrameworkofIssuesisﬁneandquitelengthy,soherethetheory
is afﬁrmed without too much detail, but there is detail in the explanations of the differences
and extensions to the basic Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix. The great ﬂexibility
of the conceptual notions underpinning an Information–Inﬂuence Matrix are displayed in
dealing with speciﬁc situations.
Our initial interest was with the ways in which the Financial Manager and co-ordinator
interactinthischangesituation,butwealsocoveredtheorganizationalastheoverallchanges
43with the Health Centres. We begin with the organizational in January 1997, when the new
system for centres started, but we were unaware of this until September 1999. Before
January 1997, with the old system, the Financial Manager had Total Information and Total
Inﬂuence over 77 centres, making the centres in a position of No Information and No
Inﬂuence. The conceptual bases of the Matrix are such that it was possible to insert both
of these items, at appropriate places on the basic Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix.
These insertions added to the explanatory ability of the organizational Matrix. The position
of No Information and No Inﬂuence for any centre indicates that it is not in the new
system.
At the time of the ﬁrst conversation with the Financial Manager the new system was
anticipated to constitute four new levels of Local Information and Inﬂuence. Level 1 was
equivalent to our Communication, Level 2 – our Consultation, Level 3 – our Participation
andLevel4–ourAutonomy.ThusournotionsaboutthestagesofInformationandInﬂuence
appeared to ﬁt these proposed changes. At that time 32 centres had moved into the new
system: 30 at Level 1, 2 at Level 2, and 45 in the old system.
WhenthestudyendedinDecember2001therewere10atLevel1,1atLevel2,1atLevel
3, and 66 with the old system. There was also one centre which had reached Level 2, but its
co-ordinator left and the centre returned to the old system. There was also recognition from
the Financial Manager, after much discussion with his colleagues, that under the existing
Spanish legislation it was impossible for a centre to move to a position of Autonomy. Based
on these discussions he provided his views about how such an Autonomous centre would
be handled. These anticipations of the Financial Manager about Autonomy ﬁtted sensibly
with our own notions about it. Thus the basic Galician Information–Inﬂuence Matrix was
validatedbyexperienceuptoParticipationandthroughdiscussiontoAutonomy.Atthesame
time the Framework of Five Organizational Issues was validated through the existence of
the stages of Local Information to Communication, Consultation and Participation, and the
Autonomy through the Financial Manager’s anticipations.
The second theoretical area concerns the Financial Manager and his interactions with
a centre co-ordinator. His theoretical personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix contained the
same constructs of information and inﬂuence as the organization. The Financial Manager’s
experience and anticipations were able to be represented on this Matrix.
The progress of the Financial Manager in the theoretical Framework of Five Issues
anticipated that the Financial Manager’s progress would be with (1) Local Information and
his inﬂuence starting in Autonomy, would move to (2) Participation, then (3) Consultation,
then (4) Communication and ﬁnally (5) would be a new relationship with a co-ordinator
and on a separate Matrix.
His actual progress on his Framework of Five Issues was (1) Local Information and
InﬂuencestartinginAutonomy,however,hemovedto(2)Communication,(3)Consultation
and (4) Participation. Also, since it was legally impossible for Autonomy to be given to a
co-ordinator,wehadtheFinancialManager’sconsideredview,that,ifself-managementhad
occurred then he would have been at (5) in a new relationship with a co-ordinator and thus a
separate personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix for the Financial Manager. This indicates
that the Financial Manager agreed with the items 1 and 5 in the theoretical Framework of
Issues. The items 2, 3 and 4 in his actual personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix were in
the reverse order to the theoretical.
44The theoretical Financial Manager’s Framework of Five Issues has been revised for
future work to be: (1) Local Information and his inﬂuence starting in Autonomy, would
move to (2) Communication, (3) Consultation, (4) Participation and (5) a new relationship
with a co-ordinator and on a separate a Financial Manager Matrix.
The third area deals with a centre co-ordinator and his interactions with the Financial
Manager. His theoretical personal Information–Inﬂuence Matrix contained the same con-
structs of information and inﬂuence as the organization and the Financial Manager. The
co-ordinator’s experience and anticipations were able to be represented on this Matrix.
The progress of the co-ordinator in the theoretical Framework of Five Issues was (1)
No Information and No Inﬂuence, (2) Communication, (3) Consultation, (4) Participa-
tion and (5) Autonomy. This Framework of Five Issues was validated from the experience
of the Financial Manager and the centre co-ordinator as far as item 4. Again the Finan-
cial Manager’s view about Autonomy, after discussions, was similar to the theoretical
position.
Currently, we have validated all three areas as far as Participation, the actual experience
of Autonomy has to wait for our future work or for others. The theoretical Frameworks of
Five Issues, including the revised personal one for the Financial Manager are available for
further testing.
We now move beyond our theoretical notions into other matters which have come from
the ﬁndings and relate to our norms. Essentially, after 5 years of the possible new system
there were 66 centres with the old system and 12 in the new system. Clearly change did not
occurinthewaythatFinancialManagerhadanticipatedwhenwehadourﬁrstconversation.
Ultimately, the optimistic Financial Manager who we had spoken with in 1999, at the end
in 2001 was very frustrated because the whole Spanish system had failed to bring about the
changes outlined in the Galician legislation.
The factual reasons we advance for this situation come from the Financial Manager, but
we have our own interpretations and comments on several facets of our ﬁndings. We have
interviewed one co-ordinator and have not been able to access other co-ordinators. People
who remained with or returned to the old system, were not a part of our agreement for we
had anticipated working with several co-ordinators.
Our perspective believes that there are likely to be a number of reasons, why some
co-ordinators have come forward to take these positions, why some centres have moved
to the new systems and stayed there, why some centres have moved to new sys-
tems and then returned to the old and why the majority have stayed with the old
systems.
Theoverarchingsetsoffacts,whichprobablyareinter-relatedare,AutonomyforHealth
Centres is legally impossible in Spain and the hypothecated tax system means that taxes
raised for a speciﬁc purpose have to be used for that purpose. Thus with a budget, there
were no possibilities of co-ordinators using funds in the ways they considered would be in
the best interests of the centre, unless their use coincided with the tax laws. In these ways
the major objectives of the legal change towards Autonomous Health Centres with more
budget autonomy are not available to any person in Spain. We consider that these have been
potentially large reasons for the lack of centres working with the new system.
Our theoretical interpretation of the Galicianization of Health Centres was an opti-
mistic one, and it was an optimistic project for the Financial Manager. At the end of our
45study, 12 out of 78 centres were in the new system. This feels almost like a pilot project
has been undertaken. At the same time it also represents some success for the Financial
Manager.
Moving to a slightly different matter, we wonder if the style and ideas of the Financial
Manager were not suitable for the majority of centres and personnel. He was left to his own
intuitionandnotofferedanytrainingforhisrole-change.Heconsideredtheco-ordinatorasa
linkbetweenthecentreandtheregion.Thestartingapproachtochange,thatheoutlined,was
to communicate information to centre co-ordinators telling them about their expenditures.
It was acknowledged that at times, a co-ordinator had to make expenditures which he could
not control, yet a co-ordinator had been informed of matters over which he had no control,
with a view to reducing expenditures. It is possible that individuals did not ﬁnd this an
acceptable experience or even unpleasant, and so withdrew, or were unprepared to become
engaged in the new system.
The ﬁnancial manger mentioned that with the new system he had provided suitable
information which a co-ordinator would understand in relation to budgets. The evidence
from the co-ordinator does not entirely match this view, when he noted that the information
was acceptable and understandable, but at times he had to ask about the meaning of terms
frompersonsintheRegionalOfﬁce.Thissituationofaperson“understanding”information,
and even using it but requiring help in some way, was found previously in a study of UK
ward sisters and accounting data (Purdy, 1993c).
Further matters related to funding. There were no additional resources available for
the new system. It was anticipated that most co-ordinators would be from the medical
profession, and the small amount they would receive on becoming a co-ordinator would not
be a ﬁnancial incentive, as they would be able to earn larger amounts in other jobs. Also,
the only physical compensations for working as a co-ordinator were the prospects of more
computers to run the administration. Perhaps these matters were not attractive.
The new system produced a plan and a budget for a centre, which the co-ordinator was
anticipated to run the centre with. One object for a co-ordinator was to make savings by not
spendingpartsofthebudget,andthenlaterhavesomeinﬂuenceinhowthesesavingswould
be spent for the centre’s beneﬁt. Maybe this system was not acceptable to the majority who
did not change from the old system. This spending of savings was forced into matters that
the tax had been raised for.
Inarelatedsphere,thelegislationenvisagedthatthequalitativeretoswouldbeusedinthe
changeprocesses.Wehadnoideawhatthesemighthavebeen,butnothingwasmentionedin
conversations. Perhaps the whole project was a retos for the Financial Manager. Maybe the
co-ordinators found it a retos to become involved and enjoyed the inﬂuence they exercised.
Apart from the Financial Manager we interviewed one Level 2 co-ordinator, from the
three co-ordinator, that had moved to at least Level 2. This means that we interviewed a
third of those with experience of Level 2. There was a great deal of similarity between
notions about change from the co-ordinator and the Financial Manager, providing some
mutual support for their views.
Of great relevance is our theoretical approach to our work and the use of the psychology
ofpersonalconstructswithitsemphasisontheactivitiesoftheindividual(Kelly,1955).Our
primeinteresthasbeentheconstruingofindividualsinthischangeprocesstowardsthenew
system. We have empirical materials from one Financial Manager and one co-ordinator,
46which are those individuals’ constructions about themselves in their job. This has provided
us with sufﬁcient materials to verify, refute or alter our theoretical constructs. Our basic
work has been achieved with Participation. Autonomy, currently legally impossible, can
be carried forward for future work in the knowledge that we already have some empirical
views from the Financial Manager which agree with our theoretical views.
The objective of the ﬁeld study was to collect data from a Financial Manager and a
co-ordinator to verify or not verify our three theoretical areas. Even though we were aware
of earlier studies that held some afﬁnities with our approaches (Purdy and Gago, in press),
we did not attempt to obtain any data that either simulated their methods or their types of
data collected, in order to compare matters. We have a few comparisons we can sensibly
make with other studies.
Earlier studies suggested that management controlled the information provision process
(Purdy and Gago, in press), and this happened in our study with the Galician management.
In the Galician case the Financial Manager was committed to the new system, but at the
national stage suitable changes did not occur.
The Galician legislation promoted the notion of Autonomy, but our study found this
legally impossible, though Participation was occurring with the Financial Manager and
some co-ordinators. There are some similarities between this non-appearance of autonomy
andthenon-appearanceofparticipationintheﬁnalproposalsaboutemployees’information
and inﬂuence provisions (European Communities Commission, 1994).
Some notions related to Autonomy have featured in a number of other studies. In one
study Arnold noted that that ending an autonomous scheme destroyed trust (Arnold, 1999).
WehavenoevidencethattrusthasbeenaffectedtheabsenceofAutonomy,buttheFinancial
Manager felt very frustrated at the failure of the whole system to bring about change.
Amoreusefulpaper,tohelpusexplorepotentialreasonsfortheoutcomesoftheGalician
change initiative, is some of the theory used to consider the position of personnel involved
inAlberta’smuseumservicefromOakesetal.(1998)intheirstudyofchange.Ifweassume
that the Galician medical practitioners constitute a profession, including holding a body of
knowledgeandculturalcapital,thenacoupleofmattersmaybededucedinparalleltoOakes
et al.’s notions. First, if these practitioners experience a threat to their body of knowledge
thenperhapstheywouldmovetothenewsystem,asinfact45centresmadenomovements.
At the same time similar practitioners in other centres may not have experienced such a
threat and have moved to the new system.
Further we use some of our Galician materials to follow Oakes et al.’s (1998) notions
about ﬁeld restricted production. If these medical practitioners are a ﬁeld of restricted
production, then these practitioners were already autonomous. This indicates that the prac-
titioners have a form of autonomy already in their Galician Health Centres. It maybe this
autonomy of the medical practitioners has been valued more by them than that held out by
Galician legislation.
We have used this paper to examine some empirical materials for comparison with and
to verify our theoretical approaches of Matrices of Information and Inﬂuence for Orga-
nizations, and the actions of a Financial Manager and a Co-ordinator, and the associated
movements of each of the three on their Frameworks of Five Issues. This study has created
a new stream of empirical research and we would encourage further studies to explore the
roles of Information and Inﬂuence including Participation and Autonomy.
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work in this paper. This is our representation of their everyday activities which we have
interpreted in our way.
We thank Tony Tinker and the particular reviewer for their comments on an earlier draft
which has helped us to improve this paper. Responsibility for this paper remains with us.
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